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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, debate has intensified regarding the accountability of large public 
companies. In particular, the present regulatory regime in the UK has subject to 
sustained critique, largely as a result of a number of spectacular corporate failures. 
This thesis focuses on one element of the above debate, namely the particular controls 
which exist in the UK to regulate the conduct of directors. The present legal and 
regulatory regime is examined with a view to assessing the adequacy of the present 
controls. In addition, reforms which have been proposed in order to strengthen the 
regulation of directors will be evaluated. The focus is on directors, as the regulation 
of directorial conduct is a first and important step towards regulating corporate 
activity as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, debate has intensified regarding the accountability of large public 
companies.! The question of accountability has arisen in both the internal context of 
the company, i.e. whether shareholders exercise sufficient power to control 
companies, and in a context external to the company, namely the ability of 
governments and/or appropriate transnational organisations to control corporate 
activity. Allied to questions of accountability and control is the issue of in whose 
interests the company should be managed and controlled. Should the interests of 
shareholders be the sole concern of corporate boards, or should companies and 
directors owe duties to interests wider than shareholders, such as employees, 
customers, consumers and the public in general?^ Should companies be more socially 
responsible? Further debate concerns the appropriate means of regulating 
transnational corporate enterprises; i f regulation is indeed considered appropriate in 
the light of many problematic issues relating to capacity, jurisdiction and 
enforcement.3 In particular, the present regulatory regime in the UK has subject to 
sustained critique, largely as a result of a number of spectacular corporate failures.'' 
Thus, consideration has to be given not only to questions of the nature of regulation 
and governance of companies, but also to the most appropriate level at which such 
regulation can best be achieved, in particular whether the European Union is better 
placed to regulate transnational companies. 
This thesis wi l l focus on one element of the above debate, namely, the particular 
controls which exist in the UK to regulate the conduct of directors. The present legal 
and regulatory regime wil l be examined with a view to assessing the adequacy of the 
present controls. In addition, reforms which have been proposed in order to 
strengthen the regulation of directors will be evaluated. The focus is on directors, as 
the regulation of directorial conduct is a first and important step towards regulating 
corporate activity as a whole. 
1 This thesis will concentrate on the mechanisms of control exercised over directors in large 
public companies, although reference will be made, where appropriate, to other forms of business 
organisation. 
2 Although consideration of such issues has intensified in recent years, such questions were first 
raised in the early part of this century. See, for example: Dodd, 'For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?', (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145; Berle, 'For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? 
A Note', (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365. 
3 See fiirther, Bradley, 'Corporate Power and Control in the 1990s: The Transnational 
Dimension', (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 269. 
^ For example, a large number of investors lost funds as a result of the collapse of the BCCI 
bank, and thousands of pensioners were worse off as a result of the Maxwell scandal. 
To this end, Chapter One wil l examine the ability of the markets for corporate control, 
products and managerial talent to influence and control directors. This analysis draws 
on the work of a number of scholars who have articulated an economic basis for legal 
analysis and reform, arguing that allowing free economic activity is the most cost-
effective and successfiil means by which to control and regulated directorial conduct. 
In opposition to such reasoning, the contentions of those who consider that the market 
places unnecessary costs on third parties and that alternative means of regulation are 
more effective wil l be analysed. 
Chapter Two considers the present common law fiduciary duties imposed on directors 
by an examination of the relevant case law. In addition, the ability of shareholders to 
enforce such duties is analysed, together with a number of reform proposals. The 
structure of the board of directors is examined in Chapter Three by analysing the 
structural reforms proposed by the Cadbury Committee on the financial aspects of 
corporate governance^, and more recently, the Greenbury Report.^ In addition, the 
reform proposals emanating from the European Union regarding the structure of the 
company and its regulatory mechanisms will be investigated. 
Many of the present means by which the conduct of directors is regulated, as well as a 
number of reform proposals, rely on the activism and participation of shareholders in 
corporate activities. Accordingly, the ability and suitability of such reliance on 
shareholder power, both individual and institutional, will be examined in Chapter 
Four. 
5 Cadbury Report, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992. 
^ Greenbury Report, Directors' Remuneration - Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury, 1995. 
CHAPTER ONE 
GOVERNANCE BY THE MARKET: 
T H E A B I L I T Y OF THE MARKET TO CONTROL THE 
CONDUCT OF DIRECTORS 
A. Introduction 
'Markets' are economic interactions between a variety of actors, including firms, 
individuals and governments. In this thesis, the term 'market/s' is used generically to 
describe several interlocking fields of economic activity, in particular: the market for 
corporate control, the product market and the market for managerial talent. Central to 
the theory of the free market is the view that the extended conflict among selfish 
economic actors produces the optimal allocation of resources.' In the context of 
controlling the conduct of directors, the market is a means of control external to the 
company, and unlike, for example, shareholder regulation of corporate activity, is 
beyond the influence of the company or its shareholders. The fact that the confrol 
exercised by the free market is external to the company is one of its principal 
attractions. It is argued that the operation of the market redresses the perceived 
weakness in the separation of ownership and control in the large company^, exercising 
the control which eludes the shareholders.-' The end product of this means of 
controlling directorial conduct is said to be the efficient and optimum distribution of 
talent, products and resources. This, in turn, achieves maximum profit realisation, 
which, it is advocated, should be the sole aim of a company. The remaining sections 
of this chapter wil l examine this thesis. 
' The rhetoric of markets is well-rehearsed elsewhere, the original exposition of the theory 
being attributed to Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Ml 6. See also: Posner, The Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1981; The Journal of 
Law and Economics Symposium on Corporations and Private Property, June 1993, Vol XXV1(2); and, 
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 1991. 
2 The thesis that in a large company there is a separation of ownership and control, and that this 
has lead to a managerial revolution of managers pursuing their own interests free from control, and not 
those of shareholders, was most famously espoused by Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932. 
3 See, inter alia, Easterbrook and Fischel, "The Corporate Contract", (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1416, at 1419, who state that "[m]anagers may do their best to take advantage of their 
investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' 
interests at heart". 
B. The Market for Corporate Control^ 
1. The operation of the market for corporate control 
The principal market which controls the conduct of directors is the market for 
corporate control. It does so by providing that "inefficient managers ... can be 
removed by stockholders' acceptance of takeover bids induced by poor performance".^ 
In deciding whether to accept a bid, the bench-mark by which shareholders will judge 
the activities of directors is their ability to maximise the resources of the company. 
Thus, i f directors do not maximise profits, the company may be the subject of a 
takeover bid, and the shareholders wil l accept the takeover offer as a means of 
increasing the value of their shares, in order to ensure that the resources of the 
company are managed by those most capable of maximising profits. The likely result 
of the takeover is that the directors will be removed fi-om their positions and, thus, the 
market for corporate control operates by way of a threat to directors, inducing their 
efficient management of corporate resources. Accordingly, the self-interested 
preoccupations of directors, i.e. the protection of their positions as directors, is 
channelled to maximum effect so that their self-interest coincides with the best 
interests of the company. 
The efficiency of management is measured by the price of a company's shares, which 
is accordingly the means by which the market for corporate control assesses 
management. I f the price of the company's shares reflects the market's perception of 
the optimum value of the shares, there will be no benefit to a predator company in 
taking over the company. In such circumstances, the market will sustain in office the 
directors who are maximising resources. However, it is not required that the price of 
the shares accurately reflect the value of the company. Indeed, it is recognised by the 
proponents of market control that the share price does not perfectly reflect the value of 
the company: it is sufficient that "the prices will be more informative than the next 
'* See, inter alia: Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", (1965) 73 Journal of 
Political Economy 110; Bradley "Corporate Control: Markets and Rules", (1990) 53 Modern Law 
Review 170; Farrar (ed), Takeovers, Institutional Investors and the Modernisation of Corporate Laws, 
Oxford University Press, 1993; Putterman (ed), The Economic Nature of the Firm, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986; Alchian and Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organisation", (1972) 62 The American Economic Review 111; Fama, "Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm", (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", 
(1937) 4 Economica 386; and the citations supra note 1. 
^ Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power, Cambridge University Press, 1981, at 10. 
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best alternative"^, which is the "regulators".' 
Accordingly, where the share price does not to reflect the market's value of the 
company's resources, a "control opportunity"* is created. A predator company will be 
able to offer a higher price for the company's shares, safe in the knowledge that, post 
takeover, a new management should be able to secure a higher share price. The 
shareholders, with only increased share price in mind, will accept the takeover bid 
which wil l increase the value of their shareholding. The utilisation of the confrol 
opportunity not only benefits the particular company which is taken over, by replacing 
management and increasing the share price, but it reinforces the threat of the takeover 
to the management of other companies, acting as a spur to efficient management. 
2. Regulation of the market for corporate control 
A number market advocates propose entirely free markets: markets devoid of all 
regulation. For example, Hayek has gone so far as to argue that the "whole idea that 
we can replace the market by central planning is based on intellectual error".' 
However, even Hayek recognises, though not explicitly, the need to ensure that 
markets are "free", and that to do so may require certain interventions in the operation 
of the markets.'" That the market for corporate control in the UK is regulated is 
axiomatic. The mode in which it is so regulated will be considered briefly in order to 
illuminate later consideration of the value of the market for corporate control as a 
means of controlling the conduct of directors. A multitude of provisions regulate the 
market for corporate control: the common law, statute law, market mechanisms, 
quasi-legal regulations and European law. A brief analysis of each will be given 
before examining the efficacy of the market for corporate control. 
2.1 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers ('the Code') sets out the means and manner 
in which a takeover bid may be launched, conducted and concluded: it does not 
^ See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 19. 
^ Ibid at 20. Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid at 20, dismiss the idea that the "regulators" may be 
able to accurately determine the value of a company and its shareholding: "Few believe that regulators 
are better at valuing terms of corporate governance than are markets." 
^ Bradley, supra note 4, at 171. 
9 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 1979 Vol. 3, at 93. 
See, Wedderbum, "Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law", (1989) 18 
Industrial Law Journal 1, at 14/15. 
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determine questions of whether a takeover will be beneficial and whether it should 
proceed, nor does it consider matters of competition policy. The Code is interpreted 
and enforced by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which is not directly legally 
enforceable as it lacks a statutory basis; it was established in 1959 as a means of self-
regulation. However, it has the force of law by means of The Stock Exchange's 
Admission of Securities to Listing, which provides that the terms of the Code must be 
complied with i f shares are to be listed on the London Stock Exchange. Its terms are 
also enforceable indirectly via the obligation on persons authorised to carry on 
investment business under the Financial Services Act 1986 to observe the Code under 
the Securities and Investment Board's Conduct of Business Rules. Further, the courts 
recognise the Code as laying down appropriate standards and practice in the conduct 
of takeovers"; and, inRv Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc^^, it 
was held that the rulings of the Panel may be subject to judicial review. 
In addition to a large number of detailed provisions, the Code sets out a number of 
general principles to which companies must adhere in the conduct of a takeover.'^  
These general principles have the advantage of not being imduly prescriptive in that 
they can be interpreted in line with their spirit, and not necessarily their letter. 
Similarly, the Panel are able to waive a number of the rules.'" In general, the terms of 
the Code are intended to ensure "fair and equal treatment of all shareholders in 
relation to takeovers".'^ 
11 See, inter alia: Dunford & Elliott Ltd v Johnston & Firth Brown Ltd, [ 1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
505 ; Morgan Crucible Co pic V Hill Samuel Bank Ltd, [1991] 1 A l l E R 148. 
12 [1987] QB 815. 
13 See further: Prentice, "Takeover Bids and the System of Self-Regulation", (1981) 10 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 406; Alexander, "Takeovers: the Regulatory Scene", (1990) Journal of 
Business Law 203. 
I'* See, for example, the application made by Trafalgar House pic to the Panel to waive Rule 35.1 
which was in the end rejected. See the Financial Times, 18 March 1995. 
15 See the Introduction to the Code at section 1(a). 
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2.2 The fiduciary duties of directors'^ 
The provisions of the Code are complemented by the fiduciary duties of directors in 
the conduct of a takeover. Principally, the fimdamental duty of a director is to act 
bona fide in what the director considers to be the best interests of the company, and 
not for a collateral purpose.'^ In addition, the director must avoid all conflicts of 
interest'^ and act with the requisite skill and care." In the context of a takeover, these 
duties most often manifest themselves in terms of the "proper purposes" test. This test 
protects the interests of shareholders by preventing management from taking certain 
actions in an attempt to defeat a bid, e.g. by issuing a large number of shares to a third 
party, and also by deterring action which may prevent a bid being launched in the first 
place, e.g. by disposing of valuable assets immediately prior to the bid launch.^" In a 
number of circumstances, directors will actually owe duties directiy to shareholders. 
In Gething v Kilne/\ it was held that the duties owed by directors to shareholders, in 
the takeover context, include a duty to be honest and not to mislead shareholders. 
Furthermore, directors are obliged to inform shareholders of a better bid offer, even i f 
this is in breach of a "lock-out" agreement with a first bidder. 
However, the remedies available to shareholders aggrieved by a breach of directors' 
fiduciary duties are limited. The proper plaintiff to bring an action for a wrong done 
to the company (directors' duties being owed to the company), is the company^\ and 
the difficulties of a shareholder bringing such a derivative action on behalf of the 
company are well documented.^" Nonetheless, it appears that there is an increasing 
For a more detailed examination, see Chapter Two. 
1 Re Smith and Fawcett, [ 1942] Ch 304. 
'8 Bray v Ford, [1896] AC 44. This duty is confirmed in the Code, General Principle 9 of which 
states that the "directors of an offeror and offeree company must always, in advising their shareholders, 
act only in their capacity as du-ectors and not have regard to their personal or family shareholdings or 
to their personal relationships with the companies". 
' ^ Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, [ 1925] Ch 407; Norman v Theodore Goddard, 
[1991] B C L C 1028. 
20 See Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility - Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 
Clarendon Press Oxford, 1993, at 137-151, where he critiques m detail the proper purposes rule and its 
application in the context of a takeover bid. 
2 ' [1972] 1 All ER 1166, at 1170. 
22 John Crowther Group pic v Carpets International pic, [ 1990] B C L C 460. 
23 Foss V Harbottle, [ 1843] 2 Hare 461. In the case of a duty owed directly to shareholders, i.e. 
the duty not to mislead, it is possible that a shareholder could bring an action for breach of the duty 
owed individually to her or him. However, the shareholder would only be able to prove damage if it 
could be proved that the takeover would not have succeeded had it not been for the misleading 
statements of the directors. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 80, who confirms that such an action would 
be unlikely to succeed. 
24 See, inter alia: Wedderbum, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle", (1957) 
15 Cambridge Law Journal 194, and (1958) 16 Cambridge Law Journal 9'i; Sullivan, "Restating the 
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wdllingness on the part of the judiciary to utilise other avenues of redress, to the 
benefit of shareholders, such as the extended scope and interpretation of section 459 
of the Companies Act^^ and the employment of a wide interpretation of the 
shareholders' personal rights exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle?^ 
27 2.3 Competition law 
Whereas the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, and the fiduciary duties of 
directors, regulate the procedure and conduct of a takeover, it is the realm of 
competition law which determines whether the takeover itself should be allowed to 
proceed. Both UK and EC competition law control the activities of takeovers in the 
UK. Although the European Commission will only have jurisdiction to consider a 
takeover i f the thresholds contained in the Merger Regulation^* are satisfied, the 
thresholds are substantial and will catch only the largest of takeovers.^ ^ Moreover, an 
assessment of a merger under the Merger Regulation is based solely on the affect 
which the takeover would be likely to have on competition, as opposed to being an 
overall assessment of the management capability of the incumbent directors, or the 
wider socio-political effects of the merger. I f a takeover does not satisfy the 
thresholds of the Merger Regulation, it wil l be subject to the Fair Trading Act 1973. 
The Fair Trading Act 1973 also has certain financial thresholds which must be 
satisfied, as well as a market share test, but these are much lower and it is only the 
smallest of transactions which wil l not be caught by its terms. Under the Fair Trading 
Act, the Director General of Fair Trading may investigate a takeover or merger which 
satisfies the thresholds, and may recommend to the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry that the Monopolies and Mergers Commission ('MMC') investigate the 
Scope of the Derivative Action", (1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal 236; Lowry and Griggs, "Minority 
Shareholder Remedies: A Comparative View", (1994) Journal of Business Law 463; Gower, Principles 
of Modern Company Law, 5th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, at 643-672; Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, 
Farrar's Company Law, 3rd ed, Butterworths, 1991, at 442-475. 
25 See, inter alia: Riley, "Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985 and the Role of the Courts", (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782; Prentice, "Minority Shareholder 
Oppression: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985", (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
55; and, Macintosh, "The Oppression Remedy: Personal or Derivative?", (1991) 70 The Canadian Bar 
Review 29. 
26 Re a Company (No 0051136 of1986), [1987] B C L C 82, and Gower, supra note 24. 
For a detailed analysis of the issues see Whish, Competition Law, Butterworths, 1993, 3rd ed; 
and, Bellamy and Child, Common Market Law of Competition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987. 
28 O J L 1989 395/1. 
29 The European Commission is attempting to review upwards the financial limits of the Merger 
Regulation and to harmonise the takeover procedures of Member States. See European Voice, 30 
November to 6 December 1995. 
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matter fiirther. I f so requested, the MMC wall investigate the takeover and report to 
the Secretary of State as to whether it may be expected to operate against the public 
interest.^" The public interest manifests itself predominantly in a consideration of 
whether "competition would be adversely affected" by the takeover or merger under 
consideration.^' Although examples can be foimd where the MMC has considered a 
muhitude of factors when deciding whether a transaction is in the public interest, 
including the implications of foreign ownership^^ the present orthodoxy, exemplified 
by the recent statements by the present UK Government, suggest that the primary 
factor to be considered is the impact of the transaction on competition." 
2.4 Summary of regulatory issues 
The regulation of the market for corporate control outlined above is premised on 
competition per se being beneficial, and it can be seen that the market needs a 
substantial amount of help i f it is to allocate the resources as efficientiy as it is said to 
do. There is considerable scope for value judgments to be made by the judiciary, the 
Takeover Panel, and the competition authorities in the regulation of the market for 
corporate control. It is not a free market in which the "invisible hand" does its work: 
the very real and vivid hand of the regulatory authorities is clearly discernible. 
3. The efficacy of the market for corporate control 
Thus far, the theoretical designs of the market for corporate control, and the reality of 
its regulation, have been considered in isolation from considerations of the efficacy of 
the market as a means of achieving an optimum allocation of resources. Critiques 
abound as to the how and the why the theory of the market for corporate confrol 
cannot operate in practice as its theory suggests.^ " Thus, it is argued that predator 
30 Sections 69( 1 )(b), 69(4) and 84 of the Fair Trading Act 1973. 
31 Annual Report of the Director General of Fair Trading for the period January to December 
1985, HC 403, 1986. 
32 See Enserch Corporation and Davy Corporation Limited, Cmnd 8360, 1981. 
33 1988 Blue Paper, Mergers Policy, particularly chapter 20. See also, for example, the 
controversy surrounding the decision of the President of the Board of Trade not to refer the proposed 
acquisition by Trafalgar House pic of Northern Electric pic to the MMC. See DTI Press Notice, 14 
February 1995. The controversy arose as it concerned the acquisition of a public utility company by a 
privately owned company raised questions of the public interest which should properly be considered 
by the MMC. See the Financial Times, 3,4,11 February 1995; and. The Observer, 5 February 1995. 
34 See, inter alia: Bradley, supra note 4; Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, supra note 24, at 605-644; 
Farrar (ed), supra note 4; Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory", in Twining (ed), Legal Theory 
and Common Law, Blackwell Oxford, 1986; Parkinson, supra note 20; Bratton, "The Nexus of 
Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal", (1989) 74 Cornell Law Review AOl. 
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companies may wish to takeover a company for a number of reasons not coimected 
with the poor management of the target. In such circumstances, the takeover is not 
fionctioning as a means by which the resources of the company will be more 
effectively managed, but it is a method by which the predator company can satisfy its 
own particular aims, be they short term growth, the personal advancement of the 
directors^^ or that the management of the predator company wishes to take over 
another company in order to increase its ovm size, thereby reducing the threat of a 
takeover of their company. A takeover for the latter purpose may be made at a price 
which does not reflect the company's worth. Moreover, i f a takeover is made solely to 
increase the size of the company and its impenetrability, the company may begin to 
engage in anti-competitive practices, thus protecting the position of the directors.^ ^ 
Alternatively, the threat of a takeover may induce the management of the target 
company to take action which does not improve efficiency and therefore the price of 
the shares of the company, and which is not in the interests of the shareholders of that 
company. Such defensive tactics may include the issue of a large number of shares to 
another company in the hope that they do not sell them, thereby making the 
acquisition of control more difficult. Alternatively, a company may include a 
provision in its articles enabling shareholders to be bought out at a certain higher price 
i f there is a change in control, thereby placing a substantial financial premium on the 
takeover of the company. More usually, the criticism of acting in their own interests 
is levelled at companies which attempt to increase their share price in the short term, 
at the expense of long term profitability, which may obscure the underlying 
inefficiency of the company." 
It is this criticism of short termism which is most often the basis for a critique of the 
market for corporate control. It is argued that the market for corporate control 
produces and sustains a culture of short term investment and profitability. As a 
company's share price is the determinant of a control opportunity, a company will , not 
35 A recent study by Conyon and Gregg, National Institute Economic Review, 18 August 1994, 
see also, The Guardian, 18 August 1994, considered the determinants of directorial remuneration and 
concluded that companies which are more cash-constrained, often as a result of takeover activity, are 
more likely to increase directorial pay, even though the company is actually less financially stable as a 
result of the action of the management. Further, executives who manage to increase their company's 
sales through takeover activity are likely to be better rewarded that those who achieve the same resuh 
through organic growth. Thus, the easier and more reliable route to higher pay is by means of a 
takeover. 
36 Such practices would be regulated by the Competition Act 1980, the Fair Trading Act 1973, 
and articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. See Whish, supra note 27. 
In the UK, defensive tactics by the boards of target companies, such as those described above, 
are regulated by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Companies Act. 
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surprisingly, be concerned with its share price. Thus, it is argued that a company will 
pay less attention and give less consideration to those investments which in fact may 
be more productive in the long term but which are not immediately profitable. Thus 
Bradley concluded that: " I f the market for corporate control does tend to discourage 
corporate managements from investing in projects which might result in large profit in 
the future in favour of projects which will result in certain profits in the short term, the 
market may not be as effective in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources as is 
often suggested. "^ ^ 
Unfortunately, there is an absence of conclusive empirical evidence on the efficacy of 
the market for corporate control. To exemplify this, two recent inquiries will be 
considered. Manson, Stark and Thomas published in 1994 a study of 38 takeovers 
and concluded as follows: 
the findings support the view that the market for corporate control: 
(i) exists to promote competition between management teams for the use 
of resources and, as such, acts as an incentive mechanism to promote 
efficiency of many different kinds. This is particularly so with respect 
to operational efficiency; and 
(ii) [it] helps shareholders establish, and is set within a context which 
shareholders have established, sufficient disciplinary controls over 
management to ensure that managers act in the interests of firms' 
owners.^' 
Thus, the study contends that its results do not support the view that changes in 
corporate control are as result of managers pursuing their ovm self-interest: or, at 
least, i f they are pursuing their self-interest that this coincides with the interests of 
shareholders. Further, it shows that the market for corporate control is an effective 
means of controlling the conduct of directors: it provides a discipline which produces 
operational gains. As the study notes, the role played by the market for corporate 
control is a matter of some dispute and that the results of the study are contrary to 
previous studies.'"' Nonetheless, the results are clear, and its authors state that the 
study should inform "takeover policy", and form the basis of future debate 
38 Bradley, supra note 4, at 177. 
39 Manson, Stark and Thomas, A Cash Flow Analysis of the Operational Gains from Takeovers, 
The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, 1994, executive summary. 
40 Ibid&il. 
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surrounding how to measure the gains or losses from takeovers 41 
On the contrary, a study by Jenkinson and Mayer concludes that there should be "no 
presumption that unfettered markets for corporate control are always appropriate", and 
that "the debate over corporate governance and control has been raging long enough to 
suggest that some alternative approaches should be considered"/^ The study found 
that in 40% of bids there was no evidence of financial failure, and that impressive 
firms are more likely to be taken over than those who performance is impeachable.''^  
This thesis cannot attempt to establish which view point is economically superior.'*'' 
One conclusion however which can clearly be made is that there is no clear evidence 
either way.''^  However, proponents of the case against the market for corporate 
control look to more than economic analysis to establish their case. The market for 
corporate control, as is evident from the discussion above, is primarily concerned with 
returns to shareholders. Therefore, i f one considers that a company should not be 
managed solely in the interests of shareholders, the market for corporate control, 
whether or not the economic data supports its contentions, is not to be supported. 
These considerations manifest themselves in a consideration of "externalities" - the 
effects of the market for corporate control on third parties. 
4. The social costs of the market for corporate control 
As noted above, critics of the market for corporate control point to its third party 
effects to counter the argument that it is an efficient allocator of resources. Such third 
party effects take two general forms. First, it is considered that the emphasis of the 
market for corporate control on share prices, management, and shareholders, distracts 
attention from those who are also affected, be they employees, consumers, creditors or 
41 Ibidzi 17. 
42 Jenkinson and Mayer, Hostile Takeovers: Defence, Attack and Corporate Governance, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1994. 
43 Ibid. 
44 For example, the majority of the Manson, Stark and Thomas study is taken up with detailed 
accounting analyses, mathematical formulae and equations, which are beyond the scope of this author. 
45 Indeed, economic data aside, the veracity of the claims of the markets advocates are the 
subject of substantial political debate. The polarity of views can also be seen by, for example. The 
Labour Party's, Winning for Britain - Labour's strategy for industrial success, which states, at 7-8, that: 
"There is little evidence that the takeover boom of the eighties produced lastmg benefits for British 
industry, although it most certainly saddled firms with the cost penalty of servicing the debt required to 
finance their acquisitions." Contrast the position of the present UK Government in DTI, Mergers 
Policy. A Department of Trade and Industry Paper on the Policy and Procedures of Merger Control, 
HMSO, 1988, paragraph 2.27: "The Government believes that the threat of the takeover is a powerful 
spur towards efficiency in the management of companies." 
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the public in general/^ Secondly, it is argued that the market for corporate control is a 
costly means by which to control the conduct of directors and that greater emphasis 
should be given to other means of control, e.g. to the structure of the board of 
directors. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the market has a number of effects on third parties which 
are "often ignored".''^ The criticism of short termism was noted above in the context 
of whether the market for corporate control is effective, but it also forms the basis of 
criticisms of the rnarket for corporate control in terms of its third party effects. The 
preoccupation with the share price of a company is said to detract from long term 
considerations which wil l be more beneficial to the public generally. For example, a 
"management which feels subject to the threat of displacement through takeover is 
likely to be reluctant to invest in research and development or in any activity which is 
unlikely to generate profits in the near fiiture, even i f that activity were a sensible long 
term strategy".*^ 
Alternatively, a takeover may yield a concentration of interests of that company in a 
particular field, potentially leading to monopolistic practices. The most blatant abuses 
of such practices will likely be curbed by the actions of the relevant competition 
authorities, but many less blatant abuses will remain."^ Where a takeover is made for 
reasons not connected with the inefficiency of the incumbent management, a predator 
may pay significantly over the odds for the shares in the target company. This may 
have the effect of increasing the debt of the company, and therefore the likelihood of 
the predator company having financial difficulties which will adversely affect 
employees and creditors. Further, it was noted above'", that a takeover may be a 
means of increasing the prestige and remuneration of senior executives, at the expense 
of shareholders and the public generally. 
For a recent example of the criticisms which may be levelled at the market for 
corporate control, consideration may be given to the proposed acquisition by Trafalgar 
House pic for Northern Electric pic. Although the takeover would not have resulted in 
a concentration of market share, the bid did give rise to substantial questions of the 
''6 See, inter alia: Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 
1; Buchanan and Faith, "Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities", (1981) 24 Journal 
of Law and Economics 95. 
Bradley, supra note 4, at 171. 
48 Ibidatm. 
49 See Whish, supra note 27. 
5^ Conyon and Gregg, i'tipra note 35. 
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public interest, as it would be a takeover of an utility company providing an essential 
service, electricity. Nonetheless, the President of the Board of Trade decided that the 
bid raised no significant issues which should be the subject of detailed consideration 
by the MMC.^' However, of greater concern was the proposed defence tactics of 
Northern Electric pic. The board of Northern Electric pic proposed a package of 
incentives, amounting to £5.07 per share, which would have substantially increased 
the debt of the company.'^ Moreover, it would have resulted in a considerable pay-out 
to shareholders, at the expense of reductions in prices to consumers, or further 
investment in the industry." Instead, it would have increased the debt of the 
company. The proposed acquisition of Northern Electric pic exemplified how the 
market for corporate control diverts management from the task of the efficient 
management of their companies. In the light of the proposed bid, other electricity 
companies were put on "bid-alert", preparing their company and themselves for 
hostile takeover attempts - thus ensuring that that is the top priority at the expense of 
the company, the industry and the public.^'' 
It would appear from the regulation of the market considered above that there is some 
form of recognition of the social costs of the market for corporate control. The City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers is concerned with the position of target shareholders 
and seeks to ensure that they are all treated equally. It fiirther provides that directors 
are to give consideration to the interests of their employees. '^ In addition, competition 
law provides a mechanism by which the public interest, and the interests of consumers 
and employees, may be considered in the context of a takeover bid (albeit to a limited 
extent). Nonetheless, the regulation of the market for corporate control is primarily 
concerned with "freeing" the market so that it is as effective as possible. Third parties 
are still left with the hope that the market does actually benefit a greater number than 
it hinders, and that those who are hindered are not too close by. 
The second element of the social costs of the market for corporate control is 
concerned with its costs. It is the "transition costs necessarily involved in the change 
from an inefficient use of resources to a more efficient use of resources" which are 
51 SM;7ranote33. 
52 See, inter alia. Financial Times 18 February 1995; Independent 21 February 1995. 
53 As a result, the Director General of Electricity Supply announced a review of electricity 
prices. See OFFER Press Notice, 7 March 1995. 
54 See, inter alia: Independent 15 February 1995; The Times, 15 February 1995; Glasgow 
Herald, 15 February 1995. 
55 See, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, general principle 9, which states: "It is the 
interests of shareholders as a whole, together with those of employees and creditors, which should be 
considered." 
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considered to be too costly.^* Thus, a consideration of the additional costs of 
takeovers and mergers reveals that although the market may allocate resources more 
effectively, it comes at a price. There are costs involved in defending a takeover bid: 
the study by Jenkinson and Mayer considered above, found that in the UK, two out of 
three bids are contested, sometimes involving more than one bidder." On the 
contrary, in Germany there has been only three contested takeovers since 1945. Each 
time a takeover bid is launched, an army of advisers to the company are employed -
solicitors, accountants, financial advisors, and public relations consultants to name a 
few - not forgetting that the time of management will become almost solely concerned 
with the takeover battle at the expense of normal management. I f a takeover succeeds, 
the same advisors wil l continue to be employed: this time to restructure the new firm, 
and smooth the transition from two companies to one. 
Nonetheless, proponents of the market for corporate control do not agree that the 
market for corporate control imposes costs on third parties: Easterbrook and Fischel 
state that the market does not "impose costs on strangers".'^  This argument is based 
on the premise that "what is optimal for the firms and investors is optimal for 
society".^' Accordingly, it is not said that the market for corporate control corrects all 
abuses and weeds out all inefficiency; it is "inevitable that a substantial amount of 
undesirable slack or self-dealing wil l occur".^° A broadly utilitarian view is taken: the 
market for corporate control wil l not prevent all abuses, and therefore some will 
suffer, but in the long run it will be beneficial for more people than it is detrimental. 
C. The Product Market 
The product market is premised on similar economic principles to those considered 
above in relation to the market for corporate control. Essentially, the market for a 
company's products comprises the market in which we all play a part, via the 
purchase, or non-purchase, of particular goods and services. The theory of the market 
for a company's goods or services, its "products", is that the market ensures that a 
company's management makes effective use of the company's resources in order that 
its products are competitive. Only i f a company's products are competitive, will the 
company be profitable, thereby determining its success or failure. An inefficient 
56 Bradley, supra note 4, at 176. 
57 Supra note 42. 
58 Supra note I, at 6. 
59 Ibid at 7. 
Ibid 
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company wil l face higher production costs and may eventually become insolvent as 
customers purchase elsewhere.*' The product market is therefore another means of 
directorial control: " i f managers are to keep their jobs they must ensure that the 
company is profitable which requires that the company's products are competitive".*^ 
There is an obvious correlation between the product market and the market for 
corporate control: i f a company's products are not competitive, the company will 
become a target on the market for corporate control. However, the product market 
may entail more effective control of management than the market for corporate 
control. The market for a company's products will operate in cycles of the economy 
where there is little corporate takeover activity, for example, in times of economic 
recession. During such stages of the economic cycle, there will be little reallocation 
of resources via takeovers and mergers, thus rendering the market for corporate 
control all but redundant. On the contrary, the market for a company's products, if, 
that is, such products have survived the effects of the economic recession, will be ever 
present. Indeed, at a time of economic struggle, the market may be even more 
effective in its allocation of resources. Further, the product market may be utilised in 
the calculation of management remuneration; it is a gauge by which to judge the 
performance of management in the market. The thesis is that i f a company's products 
are successful, the company is performing well under the incumbent management and 
should be so rewarded. The product market will be a usefiil incentive to management 
to secure an improved position for the company.*^ 
However, as with the market for corporate confrol, the theory is not always borne out 
in practice. The study by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
referred to above, showed that the remuneration of directors had more to do with 
reducing union power and the blunt effect of increased sales figures as a result of 
takeover activity, than the measure of a company's performance.*'' The study raises 
the question of whether there is "effective control of managerial pay setting by 
shareholders", via the product, or any other, market.*^ 
It is also clear that the product market wil l not be effective where a company operates 
in a virtual, or actual, monopoly situation. In such circumstances, the company can 
61 
62 
Posner, supra note 1, at 383. 
Parkinson, supra note 20, at page 114. 
63 Ibid. 
64 5Mpranote35. 
65 Ibid. 
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effectively control the price for its products, without reference to the market. Further, 
even where a company does not operate in a monopoly, it may be dominant and 
engage in anti-competitive practices. Such practices and monopoly industries are 
regulated by UK and EC competition law. However, it should be noted that "an 
imperfectly competitive market will not quickly convert... inefficiency into 
insolvency"^*, nor wil l the regulatory authorities be keen to intervene. However, 
despite the aforementioned drawbacks to the efficiency of the product market, it is 
argued that it is the market which "affects management behaviour in the most obvious 
way".*' This is because, with the exception of the monopoly, the product market 
carmot but have an affect on a company's performance and profits. It is the extent, 
and utility, of the control which is exercised, which is the source of dispute. 
.68 D. The Managerial Market 
The market for managerial services is the market of professional executive directors. 
This market is often the justification for substantial directorial remuneration packages; 
the argument being that i f a director is not paid a particular sum, the director will be 
engaged elsewhere as his or her services are more highly valued on the market for 
managerial talent, than the particular company acknowledges via its remuneration 
package. Much emphasis has been placed on the market for managerial talent as 
legitimating the management structure of a large corporation. Fama explains that "the 
viability of the large corporation with diffuse security ownership is ... explained in 
terms of a model where primary disciplining of managers comes through managerial 
labor markets, both within and outside the firm".*' Thus, the theory is that although in 
a large company, shareholders have little direct control of management, the control is 
exercised via the managerial market. This argument is greatly similar to that 
advanced in support of the market for corporate control: shareholders may exercise 
little control over inefficient management, but the market does. 
The market for managerial talent is said to work in two particular ways. First, the 
market works internally within the particular company. The managers of a particular 
firm are those best placed to judge whether or not the performance of other managers 
is optimum. Thus, managers who do not believe that others are managing efficiently 
66 Eisenberg, "The Structure of Corporation Law", (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461, at 
1489. 
67 Parkinson, supra note 20, at 114. 
68 See, inter alia, Fama, supra note 4. 
69 Ibid at 295. 
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and effectively, wil l bring such conduct to the attention of either the shareholders or 
the markets.™ The markets and/or the shareholders will then be able to make an 
assessment of the manager under scrutiny; the manager will either be removed from 
office, or his or her value in the market for managerial services will be reduced. 
However, such a model depends upon the directors of each company engaging in 
monitoring, and reporting on the very people with whom the directors is supposed to 
be working. Parkinson notes that this market can barely be cost effective i f the 
managers are concerning themselves with the conduct of their fellow directors rather 
than the management and performance of the company. '^ Thus, in order for the 
managerial market to operate effectively, increased regulation of the company may be 
' required in the form of non-executive directors (to monitor the executive directors on 
the board), or at least a mechanism for reporting on allegedly errant directors. The 
resulting paradox is that the effectiveness of the managerial market depends upon the 
regulation of management itself, exactiy what the market is supposed to replace. It is 
such regulation which is anathema to the market theorists who advocate corporate 
regulation by markets. Moreover, the power of management is particularly dominant 
and it would be a very unusual director who risked his or her own position, and the 
company's, by exposing inefficiency or incompetence. Thus, Parkinson concludes 
that "the forces of the internal market, such as they are, will often be defeated by 
management power and board cohesiveness".'^  
Secondly, the market works outside the company and its directors, and operates in the 
market place; this is the market for managerial services between companies. The 
presumption is that the remuneration and performance of an executive is transparent, 
thereby affording the opportunity of widespread comparison. The theory of the 
market for managerial talent has immediate resonance. It is part of a general public 
perception that i f a position is particularly valued, or i f a person is particularly able, 
then that person and any person doing that job, should be well remunerated. Thus, the 
argument is made that, only i f a person is highly paid, is worth attached to the 
position. In the market for managerial services, this translates into the argument that 
the market itself wil l highlight the able executives and remunerate them accordingly: 
the higher paid an executive in the market is the more valued and therefore able the 
person. 
'''^  Fama and Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control", (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 3 01, at 315. 
1 Parkmson, supra note 20, at 117. 
72 Ibid. 
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There are a number of drawbacks with the basis and operation of this market. The 
performance of an executive will hot be easily discernible by company outsiders. An 
executive may appear to be supremely able, but actually the company's products are 
particularly efficient at a particular time, perhaps because of changes made a number 
of years previous by a different executive. An executive may appear able, but actually 
has a number of very able people working for him or her, without which the executive 
would not be able to perform. Further, the actual remuneration package of the 
particular executive may not be easily comparable; the remimeration of a director may 
be made up of a number of components, for example, salary, performance related pay, 
share options and share ownership. Substantial criticism has been levied recently 
concerning the lack of transparency of the remuneration packages of directors", and it 
was noted above that the remuneration of executives did not necessarily reflect 
corporate performance. Thus, the remuneration which an executive receives does not 
necessarily reflect a market appreciation of the benefits which a particular person may 
bring to another company. More particularly, remimeration may reflect the power of 
the particular executive over the board of the company and the general meeting.''' 
A recent relevant innovation in terms of corporate governance has been the 
remimeration committee comprising a majority of non-executive directors." Such 
committees are intended to monitor the remuneration of executives and ensure 
accountability. However, recent comment on the level of executive pay has argued 
that the existence of remuneration committees, rather than restricting remuneration of 
executives, are encouraging a spiral of increasing remuneration.'* Thus, the 
^3 See, inter alia: the report of the Greenbury Committee Directors' Remuneration - Report of a 
Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, 17th July 1995, which was established by the 
Government, under the auspices of the Confederation of British Industry, see CBI Press Release, 16 
January 1995, as a resuh of continuing public concern over the remuneration of senior executives, 
particularly those in the newly privatised industries; Accounting Standards Board's Urgent Issues Task 
Force abstract on the Disclosure of Directors' Share Options, 29 September 1994; the announcement by 
the Government that it is considering an amendment to the Companies Act ensuring greater disclosure 
of share options, Financial Times, 3 November 1994; Association of British Insurers, Long Term 
Remuneration of Senior Executives, 25 May 1994. 
•^ 4 See Ramsay, "Directors and Officers' Remuneration: The Role of the Law", (1993) Journal of 
Business Law 351, for a detailed analysis of recent studies regarding the levels of directorial 
remuneration. 
•^ 5 See further Chapter Three which considers the Cadbury Report on corporate governance and 
the Greenbury Report and their recommendations for remuneration and other committees to be 
established to monitor management. 
'^ 6 See, for example, "Boom time on the Boards", The Guardian, 18 June 1994, where the issue 
of directors' pay is examined poj^-Cadbury. The report concludes that the existence of remuneration 
committees, primarily made up of non-executives who themselves hold executive positions at other 
companies, has lead to an increase in the levels of remuneration of executives, even at a time of 
recession and decreasing productivity. 
19 
remuneration of executives may often not be representative of the particular skills of 
the relevant executive and this is a consequence of the emphasis on the market for 
managerial services. The final point to raise when questioning the value of the market 
for managerial services, is the issue of whether there can truly be said to be a market 
for the services of top executives. The number of companies which command 
particularly high salaries for top executives is small and, as noted, the remuneration of 
the small number of executives may be unrepresentative of the market. Thus, the 
market that there is, is dominated by a small number of individuals, thus reducing any 
efficiency of the market." 
E . Conclusions: The Market as a Means of Directorial Control 
The contention of those who advocate market control of the company may be 
summarised as follows: "the operation of the market imposes a discipline which is 
sufficient to secure an acceptable level of managerial efficiency, without giving rise to 
the costs that flow from reliance on a liability regime".'^ In other words, there must 
be some control of companies, and the market is the most efficient method. The 
market is the said to be the most cost-effective method of corporate regulation as it 
does not involve the costs of non-executives, self-regulatory bodies, governmental 
agencies and the courts. Any external regulation of markets which is required is 
merely regulation in order to free the markets; such regulation being justified i f it 
corrects the distortions of the market. The market theorists recognise the problems 
highlighted by the debate on the separation of ownership and control in large 
companies, but argue that the control of shareholders is replaced by the market, which 
is more efficient that shareholder control.^f Further, the theory of market control does 
not state that every example of wrongdoing will be eradicated, but that "[mjarkets that 
let particular episodes of wrongdoing slide by, or legal systems which use deterrence 
rather than structural change to handle the costs of management, are likely very 
effective in making judgements about optimal governance structures".^" 
However, as has been shown, the reality of the market theories may not always be 
borne out in practice. Brudney emphatically states that "there is little doubt that the 
77 Parkinson, supra note 20, at 118. 
78 Ibid at \n. 
79 For a defence of the present position, see Alcock, 'Corporate Governance: A Defence of the 
Status Quo', (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 898. 
80 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 3, at 1422. However, it is not explained why this should 
be the case. 
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market is inadequate to foster responsible corporate behaviour in many areas''.^ ' Hopt 
notes that there are difficulties with market regulation, particularly in regard to "how 
to develop such market forces i f they do not yet exist or work satisfactorily", 
"determining the right mix between state regulation and self-regulation", and how 
"state-controlled corporations, groups of companies and international enterprises can 
be effectively exposed to the such market forces".Hopt concludes that "improving 
corporate governance through market forces is ... problematic".^^ 
Moreover, the regulation of the market, even i f it is only to "free" the market, and it 
was considered above that this is not solely the case, imposes significant costs on the 
economy. The regulatory regime outlined above in relation to the market for 
corporate control is detailed and complex, and involves considerable costs in terms of 
its compliance, interpretation, enforcement and creation. In the product market, 
significant sums are spent regulating the practices of, inter alia, the creation, 
marketing, selling of the products. The managerial market also has abuses which are 
considered to be contrary to the public interest, hence the controversies over the 
remuneration of executives and the steps now being taken to correct such abuses. 
However, objections to market regulation are theoretical as well as practical. Stokes 
argues that the market does not act in the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders in the company and that this, of itself, is not satisfactory.^'' Others argue 
that regulation ought to be in the control of those whom it affects, i.e. not in the hands 
of the market: "the necessary regulation and administration ought to be as far as 
possible be removed from the centralised state to structures more amenable to popular 
control and influence".Thus, employees, consumers and shareholders should be 
regulating companies, not the 'invisible hand'. In addition, it is argued that companies 
should be regulated in order to achieve wider social goals than merely profit 
maximisation.^* 
81 Brudney, "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?", (1982) 95 
Harvard Law Review 597, at 658. See also: Bratton, supra note 34; Brudney, "Corporate Governance, 
Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract", (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1403; Buxhaum, 
"Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal Doctrine", (1984) 45 Ohio State Law Journal 
515. 
82 Hopt, "New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor 
Representation on Corporate Boards", (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 113 8, at 1342. 
83 Ibid at 1343. 
84 Stokes, supra note 34, at 174-175. 
85 Cotterrell, "Feasible Regulation for Democracy and Social Justice", (1988) \5 Journal of Law 
and Society 5, at 20, arguing that those who are most closely affected by decisions should play a part in 
their determination. 
86 See, for example, Wedderbum, "The Social Responsibility of Companies", (1985) 15 
21 
Whatever the normative arguments, it is clear that the debate will continue. Further, it 
is clear that markets do effect some control over corporate conduct but that such 
control entails compliance costs and may adversely affect third parties. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate to consider the alternative means of regulating the conduct of 
directors in an attempt to consider whether such means will be more effective, and 
less destructive. The following chapters will consider a number of alternative means 
of regulating the company and its officers in this context. 
Melbourne University Law Review 4, and the citations therein. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN ANALYSIS OF DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. Introduction 
Chapter One considered the control exercised by the market over the conduct of 
directors. In particular, the markets for products, managerial talent and corporate 
control were examined. It was noted that markets are an external means of confroUing 
the conduct of directors, and as such are not easily open to manipulation by 
shareholders and directors. Further, markets are only regulated in order to make them 
function more efficiently, and that otherwise, markets are allowed to tread their own 
course. It was considered that whether markets controlled directorial conduct in an 
effective manner was a moot point. Further, whether or not markets did perform 
effectively, the costs of their so doing may outweigh the benefits. Such costs include 
the financial costs of the regulation, and the compliance costs associated therewith, 
together with the effects which markets have on third parties. Accordingly, it was 
considered that it is appropriate to examine alternative means of regulating the 
conduct of directors in order to consider whether such means are more cost-effective 
and less harmftil to third parties. 
In this light, this chapter will analyse a fiirther external control on directorial conduct, 
namely the fiduciary duties of directors. Directors' duties are described as external as 
they are imposed on companies and their directors by the legislature, or the common 
law, and proscribe certain types of behavioxir, and demand others. The control 
exercised by directors' duties is contrasted with the internal controls which are the 
subject of the Chapters Three and Four. 
B. Directors' Fiduciary Duties' 
This section wil l be divided into three parts: first, it will be considered to whom 
fiduciary duties are owed; secondly, the content of the duties will be examined; and, 
thirdly, the enforcement of the duties will be addressed. 
' The discussion which follows will refer to "directors", but it should be noted that the fiduciary 
duties of directors will apply to all senior executives authorised to act on behalf of the company. See 
Canadian Aero Service v O'Malley, [1973] 40 DLR 371, at 381. For a detailed consideration of the 
nature of the director as fiduciary, see Sealy, "Director as Trustee", (1967) 25 Cambridge Law Journal 
83. 
1. To whom are fiduciary duties owed? 
1.1 The company 
The orthodox position is often stated by reference to the judgment of Greene MR in 
Re Smith and Fawcett wherein he stated that directors must always act "bona fide in 
what they consider, not what the court may consider, is in the interests of the 
company, and not for any collateral purpose".2 Greene MR's assessment is often 
considered to be the definitive statement of the law. However, it does not answer all 
questions. The iteration that the directors must act bona fide in the interests of the 
company is ambiguous. Clearly, it does not mean that "the directors must use their 
powers to promote the welfare of the legal entity, though technically the duty is owed 
to the entity", as a "requirement to benefit an artificial entity, as an end in itself, would 
be irrational and fixtile, since a non-real entity is incapable of experiencing well-
being".3 Therefore, the meaning of "bona fide in the interests of the company" means 
something other than the interests of the "company". The "interests of the company" 
only has meaning when considered in the context of the company's purpose and the 
purpose is determined by reference to the purposes attributed thereto by human actors. 
As Parkinson concludes: "The correct position is thus that the corporate entity is a 
vehicle for benefiting the interests of a specified group or groups. "4 
The group in whose interests the company is to be managed are the shareholders. 
Thus, in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd, Lord Evershed MR stated that "the 
phrase "the company as a whole" does not... mean the company as a commercial 
entity as distinct from its corporators".5 Further, in Kinsella v Russell Kinsella Pty 
Ltd, it was stated that "the proprietary interests of shareholders entitle them as a 
general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors 
arise ".6 Thus, the exhortation to act bona fide in the interests of the company can be 
interpreted to mean that "[t]he duty of management can accordingly be stated as a 
duty to promote the success of the venture, in order to benefit the members".^  
However, this does not of itself clarify the position. Are the directors to act in the 
2 [1942] Ch 304, at 306. 
3 Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility - Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 
Clarendon Press Oxford, 1993, at 76. 
4 Ibid at n. 
5 [1951] Ch 286, at 291. 
6 [1986] 10 A C L R 395, at 401. 
Parkinson, supra note 3, at 77. 
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interests of present shareholders only or are they to have regard to possible fiiture 
shareholders? Further, is the duty owed to shareholders as individuals or only 
collectively? The traditional interpretation is that the directors must exercise their 
discretion and balance the interests of "present and fiiture members".8 Thus, whereas 
it was initially posited that the objective of imposing fiduciary duties on directors was 
to act as a means of control; it can be seen that in the exercise of their duties, directors 
have considerable discretion. I f directors can act by reference to the interests of fiiture 
shareholders, they are not restricted to follow the interests of the present shareholders, 
the owners of the company in whose interests the duties were imposed in the first 
place. It would seem that the directors may regard the interests of the members of the 
company as a continuum.^ 
1.2 Shareholders 
It was considered above that directors are obliged to act bona fide in the mterests of 
the company, which manifests itself in a duty to act in the interests of shareholders 
generally: the duty is not owed to individual shareholders, except in certain limited 
circumstances. This basic principle was confirmed in Percival v Wright.Although 
this decision has been widely criticised", the only significant inroad into its sanctity is 
the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Coleman v Myers. ^'^ Coleman v 
Myers involved directors giving advice to shareholders in a small family company in 
which the directors held a position of trust. The New Zealand Court of Appeal held 
that directors can owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders, but that this does 
not arise by reason of the shareholder/director relationship: there must be other 
supporting evidence which would lead a court to finding that the directors had 
8 The Savoy Hotel Ltd and the Berkeley Hotel Company Ltd: Investigation under section 165(b) 
of the Companies Act 1948: the Report of E Milner Holland QC, DTI Investigation Report, 1954. 
^ It has, therefore, been argued that the "'shareholder' to which management should regard itself 
as accountable is not simply those individuals who happen to be shareholders today ... but to 
"ownership" as an institution over time". See Williams, "Corporate Accountability and Corporate 
Power", in Williams & Shapiro, Power and Accountability: The Changing Role of the Board of 
Directors, 1979, at 23. 
[1902] 2 Ch 421. In Percival v Wright the directors purchased shares from some of the 
company's shareholders without disclosing that they themselves were presently negotiating the sale of 
the entire undertaking to a third party which would have substantially increased the value of the shares. 
It was held that the directors were not under a duty to inform the shareholders of the negotiations; they 
did not owe a duty to the individual shareholders. 
' ' See, inter alia: Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, the Cohen Committee, 
Cmnd 6659, paragraphs 86-87; Report of the Company Law Committee, the Jenkins Committee, Cmnd 
1749, paragraph 89. 
'2 [1977]2NZLR225. 
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breached "sensible and fair principles of commercial morality". >3 Whether or not such 
a duty wil l be imposed in particular circumstances will depend upon all the 
circumstances of the case and the nature of the responsibility which in a real and 
practical way the director/s assumed towards the shareholder/s.'4 On the facts, the 
directors were held to have breached their duty by withholding information from the 
shareholders and were held liable to account. 
Although, the decision in Coleman v Myers has not been directly followed in the 
English courts, a number of cases have considered the obligations which directors do 
owe directly to shareholders. These cases have mainly arisen in the context of 
takeover bids, where shareholders will often rely heavily on the advice of directors in 
determining the outcome of the bid. In Gething v Kilner^^ it was held that directors 
had a duty to be honest and not to mislead shareholders. The courts went further in 
Heron International Limited v Grade^^ where it was held that directors were obliged 
to obtain for shareholders the opportunity to reject or accept the highest bid possible. 
This case has been doubted'^, and, it is argued, should be considered to turn on its 
particular facts. Nonetheless, the position in Gething v Kilner has been confirmed, 
and further, it has been held that directors must not exercise their fiduciary duties in a 
manner which would inhibit the choice of the shareholders. The exact nature of these 
duties were considered fiilly in Dawson International pic v Coats Paton plc^^, wherein 
it was held that the obligations of honesty and not to mislead were not pre-existing 
fiduciary duties, but could be characterised as a potential liability arising out of their 
words or actions which can be based on ordinary principles of law. In addition, in 
exceptional circumstances, directors can assume fiduciary duties towards shareholders 
individually, where, for example, shareholders appoint the directors as their agents. 
'3 Ibid 
'4 The factors which the New Zealand Court of Appeal held were relevant to its fmduig in 
Coleman v Myers included: the closely held nature of the company; the dependence of the shareholders 
for information on the directors; the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence; the significance 
of the transaction to the parties; and, the extent of any positive action taken on behalf of the directors to 
promote it. 
'5 [1972] 1 All ER 1166. There are considerable questions over the ability of a shareholder to 
bring an action for a breach of this duty. See, for example, Bradley, "Corporate Control: Markets and 
Rules", (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 170, at 180. 
16 [1983] B C L C 244. 
•7 See Re A Company (no 008699 of1985), [1986] BCLC 382, and Dawson International pic v 
Coats Paton pic, [1989] B C L C 233. 
18 [1990] B C L C 560. 
19 Allen V Hyatt, [1914] TLR 444. 
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1.3 Creditors 
It has already been noted that directors may exercise a substantial discretion in 
interpreting their duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company in that their 
fiduciary duties are not owed to particular shareholders, or to all present shareholders 
collectively, but to the members of the company as a continuum. In addition, recent 
developments in respect of the rights of creditors show that the discretion of the 
directors to act in the interests of the company extends to non-shareholders, including 
creditors. The orthodox position that directors owe no duties to creditors was 
confirmed in Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and 
Petrochemical Services Ltd^° where three large multinational companies formed a 
subsidiary which went into liquidation owing approximately £114 million. Dillon LJ 
held that a company owed no duty of care to creditors "present or future".^' However, 
as a resuh of the several recent cases discussed below, the position is no longer clear. 
In Kinsela v Russell Kinsella Pty Ltd the position was stated to be as follows: 
In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them 
to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors arise. 
If, as a general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the 
directors, there can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have 
done. But where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. 
They become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to 
displace the power of the shareholders and the directors to deal with the 
company's assets.22 
This statement was approved by Dillon LJ in West Mercia Safetyware Ltd v Dodd^^, 
and in Lohnro Ltd v Shell Petroleum Lord Diplock stated that the duties of the 
directors to consider the interests of the company were not "exclusively those of its 
shareholders but may include those of its creditors".The position was taken fiirther 
by Nourse J, who, in Brady v Brady, stated that "where the company is insolvent, or 
doubtfiiUy solvent, the interests of the company are in reality the interests of existing 
creditors alone".^5 
20 [1983] Ch 258. 
21 at 288. 
22 Swpranote 5, at401. 
23 [1988] B C L C 250. 
24 [1980] 1 WLR 627, at 634. 
[1989] AC 755. Although the House of Lords, [1988] 2 All ER 617, overruled Nourse J on 
27 
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Thus, it has been recognised by the courts that within the company there are 
competing proprietary interests: those of shareholders and creditors. It having been 
recognised that there is a transfer of property rights in the company when it becomes 
insolvent, the creditors thus becoming the owners of the company^ ,^ the law, in 
keeping with protection afforded to proprietary interests, now safeguards the interests 
of creditors.27 However, the recognition of the interests of the creditors in the 
company is not without conceptual and practical difficulties. It is obvious that the 
interests of the shareholders exist fi-om the inception of the company. But, i f the 
interests of the creditors only intercede when the company is insolvent, or, more 
unlikely, "doubtfully solvenf'^s, when exactly do the interests of creditors arise? Is it 
the moment that the company is unable to pay its debts? Does this therefore preclude 
the directors from taking action to recover the position of the company and return to 
solvency, which could, arguably, be in the interests of the shareholders?^^ Moreover, 
can the shareholders ratify the failure of the directors to consider the creditors? 
Prentice states that were the shareholders to be able to ratify the breach of duty this 
would "drive the entity principle to absurd lengths".^ '^  He continues that the point of 
the Kinsella iudgment is that, inter alia, there comes a point when the interests of the 
shareholders cease to have any relevance to the company and this should simply 
"denude"^' the shareholders of any power to ratify this breach. Exactly how this is to 
operate in practice is, however, far from clear. 
the facts, finding that the creditors interests had been considered, the obiter statements of Nourse J 
were not disputed. See also Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd, [1986] 1 WLR 1512, 
where Lord Templeman stated that: "A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the 
creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and that 
its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of 
the creditors". This suggests that the duty owed by directors to creditors arises long before the 
company is actually msolvent or even nearing insolvency. 
26 In keeping with the analysis of the extension of fiduciary duties being owed to creditors on the 
basis of property rights, it is doubtful whether the judgment of Nourse J in Brady v Brady, supra note 
25, stating that the interests of creditors intrude, even where a company is "doubtfully" solvent, is an 
accurate or appropriate statement of the law. 
'^^  See also Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd, [ 1990] 3 All ER 404, 
where it was held, at 407, that "although directors are not liable as such to creditors of the company, a 
du-ector may by agreement or representation assume a special duty to a creditor of the company". To 
the extent that this judgment holds that directors could be held to assume a special obligation towards 
creditors when the company is msolvent, or doubtfiilly insolvent, it is consistent with the law as it 
stands. 
28 Nourse J, jM/»ra note 25. 
29 A similar confiict is apparent in the interpretation of section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
See Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law, Butterworths, 1991, 3rd ed, at 716-718. 
30 Prentice, "Directors, Creditors and Shareholders", in McKendrick (ed). Commercial Aspects 
of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1992, at 80. 
31 Ibid. 
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It would seem, therefore, that directors may, at some stage, owe duties to the creditors 
of their companies, but exactly when this duty arises and how it is to be enforced is 
not clear. The absence of clear guidance can only add to the discretion of the 
directors, as directors are obliged to act in what they consider to be the interests of the 
company. This is a subjective test which therefore gives a director considerable 
freedom to argue that, in his or her opinion, the particular action was in the interests of 
the company, whether it manifest itself in terms of the interests of the shareholders or 
creditors. 
1.4 Employees 
Thus far, it has been established that directors must act in the interests of the 
shareholders and, in particular circumstances, the creditors. The law seeks to protect 
creditors and shareholders in the form of directors' fiduciary duties by virtue of their 
proprietary interests in the company. In this context, it would appear unlikely that 
directors would be held to owed duties directly to employees, who have, in traditional 
jurisprudence, no proprietary rights in the company.^ 2 j ^ j s is confirmed by the fact 
that although directors are obliged to consider the interests of employees in certain 
circumstances, this obligation may only be enforced by shareholders, thus supporting 
the view that the directors only, effectively, owe duties to those with proprietary 
interests in the company. 
Historically, it was considered that directors may consider the interests of a company's 
employees, but only as part of determining the interests of the company generally; the 
interests of the employees were not free standing. This position was evident from the 
decision in Parke v Daily News^^ where directors wished to donate the proceeds of the 
sale of the business to the employees, in order to compensate them for the loss of their 
employment. It was held that the directors did not have the power to make such a 
payment to the employees, as this would not be in the interests of the company as a 
whole, but only in the interests of the employees.^ '* 
32 For a discussion of proprietary interests being formed on the basis of an interest in property as 
opposed to a legal entitlement, see, inter alia: Cotterrell, "Feasible Regulation for Democracy and 
Social Justice", (1988) 15 Journal of Law and Society 5; and, de Sousa Santos, "On Modes of 
Production of Law and Social Power", (1985) 13 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 299. 
33 [1962] Ch 927. 
34 The Companies Act 1980 reversed the decision in Parke, by allowing the directors to make 
provision for the employees in connection with the transfer of the undertaking of the company, 
notwithstanding that the exercise of the power is not "in the best interests of the company". See section 
74 of the Companies Act 1980, now sections 719 Companies Act 1985 and 187 of the Insolvency Act 
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However, the Companies Act 1980 placed a specific duty on directors to consider the 
interests of the employees, although this raises as many questions as it purports to 
answer.35 The now section 309 of the Companies Act provides that: "The matters to 
which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions include the interests of the company's employees in general as well as the 
interests of its members." Does this mean that the duty of directors to consider the 
interests of the employees is now free standing and justiciable? Will directors be able 
to overlook the interests of shareholders, having a defence to a shareholders' action for 
breach of duty? Or, i f not, is it that the directors must first consider the interests of the 
employees, then carry on regardless, following the interests of the shareholders?36 
A consideration of the enforcement mechanism provided in section 309 discloses the 
futility of the section, in terms of ensuring protection and consideration of the interests 
of employees. Section 309(2) states that "the duty imposed by this section [section 
309(1)] on the directors is owed by them to the company (and the company alone) and 
is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its 
directors". It was shown above that owing duties to the company in effect means 
owing duties to shareholders' in general and, in certain circumstances, creditors. 
Thus, the duty imposed by section 309 is owed to shareholders and creditors. 
Furthermore, section 309(2) states that the duty is to be enforced in the same manner 
as other directors' duties owed to the shareholders, namely the derivative action. 
Thus, the mechanism for enforcement is reliant on a shareholder taking action against 
the directors of the company, relying on the "tired, old learning of the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle".^"^ As Wedderbum points out, there was never any "intention to encourage 
shop stewards to come to work clutching a derivative writ in one hand and the rule in 
Foss V Harbottle in the other".3^ It is unlikely, even i f a shareholder were to attempt 
to take action in defence of the rights of the employees, that the breach by the 
1986. 
35 See, inter alia. Prentice, "A Company and Its Employees: The Companies Act 1980", (1981) 
10 Industrial Law Journal 1. 
36 It has been pointed out that the section could have been worse: the duty to consider the 
interests of the employees is mandatory, not optional: "are to have regard" instead of "are entitled to 
have regard". The draft bills leading to the Companies Act 1980 used the optional wording. See, inter 
alia. Birds, "Making Directors Do Their Duties", (1980) 1 Co Law 67, at 72: "Obviously this is an 
important difference in that directors who are shown to have failed to give any consideration at all to 
the interests of employees would be in breach of duty", although Birds notes the futility of this 
proposition; "But surely this will be virtually impossible to prove?". 
3'^  Supra note 35, at 4. 
38 Wedderbum, "Trust, Corporation and the Worker", (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 204, 
at 235. 
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directors of this duty would amount to a fi-aud on the minority, one of the exceptions 
to the rule in Foss v Harbottle?^ 
Furthermore, were it to be established that the directors had breached their duty to 
consider the interests of the employees, the shareholders are entitled to take action to 
ratify certain breaches of directors duties.'*" Thus, the breach of duty which is aimed 
at including the employees in the "interests" of the company, widening the overly 
restrictive duties to act in the interests of the shareholders, can be ratified by the very 
party whose interests may be presumed to be in conflict with those of the employees. 
It can be seen that the scope of directors to act in the interests of the employees is not, 
on its face, meaningful, largely because of the problems of enforceability, and 
resolution conflicts of interest. What is significant is that section 309 represents 
another step forward in making the duties of directors extremely vague and protean. 
A director can defend him or herself in an action for breach of duty, by claiming to 
have considered, inter alia, the interests of present shareholders, fiiture shareholders, 
creditors and employees. 
2. The nature of directors' fiduciary duties 
The fiduciary duties imposed on directors take a number of forms, the substance and 
delineation of which overlap. Broadly, the duties of directors can be identified as 
follows: the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company; the duty not to act 
for a collateral purpose; the duty to act with skill and care in the performance of the 
director's duties; the duty not to pursue conflicting interests; and the duty not to profit 
from the office of director, other than with the appropriate approvals. Each of these 
duties wi l l be considered in turn. 
2.1 The duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company 
There are two elements to this duty: the duty to act bona fide, and the duty to act in 
the interests of the company. The nature of the obligation to act in the interests of the 
company was broadly examined by section B 1.1, above, when considering to whom 
39 [1843] 2 Hare 461. See infra. 
Where the breach is mala fides, it is not ratifiable. Cook v Decks [1916] 1 AC 554; but it is 
ratifiable where otherwise, see Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver, [1942] 1 All ER 378. Where the 
breach is ratifiable, the directors can, as shareholders, vote to ratify then- own wrongdoing. Grant v 
United Kingdom SwithBack Railways Co, [1888] 40 ChD 135. 
31 
fiduciary duties are owed. The discussion in B 1.1 concentrated on the meaning of the 
term "interests of the company" and found that this meant, very broadly, the interests 
of the shareholders generally, present and fiiture. However, the interests of the 
company wil l also encompass the interests of creditors and employees, but only in 
certain limited circumstances. 
The first element, the duty to act bona fide is subjective. The duty is to act in what the 
director considers to be the interests of the company. Thus, a court will be exfremely 
reluctant to impose its view of what is in the best interests of the company, and, 
presuming that the action of the director is within a reasonable range of responses, 
then the judgment of the director will not be called into question. Notwithstanding 
this subjective test, it has been held that i f the actions of a director are such that no 
reasonable director would have taken such steps, then the actions can be set aside.'" 
This test is not a test of what a court would consider in the best interests of the 
company, but what another director would so consider. 
2.2 The duty not to act for a collateral purpose 
The corollary of the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company is the 
obligation not to act for a collateral purpose, the "proper purposes" doctrine. The 
objective of this duty is to prevent directors from insulating themselves from control, 
whether such control comes from the shareholders in general meeting, or from the 
market for corporate control.'*^ The ability of shareholders to remove directors from 
their positions, by means of an ordinary resolution passed in general meeting, is one 
of the fimdamental principles of shareholder control of directors.'*3 Accordingly, 
where directors are able to circumvent the exercise of such a power by means of, for 
example, share allotments, the control of the shareholders would be limited. Thus, the 
duty is particularly important in the context of the allotment of shares by directors, but 
is not limited to such circumstances.'*'* Transactions by directors which are foimd to 
have been activated for an improper purpose can be set aside by the court. 
'*! Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Limited, [1927] 2 KB 9, at 18. 
'*2 For a consideration of the market for corporate control, see Chapter One, and Parkinson supra 
note 3, at 137-158. 
'*3 Section 303 of the Companies Act. Note, however, the ability of shareholders and the 
company to agree to the restriction of the statutory power by means of weighted voting rights. Such 
action was held to be valid in Bushell v Faith, [1970] 2 WLR 272. See further, McGlynn, "The 
Constitution of the Company: Mandatory Statutory Provisions v Private Agreements", (1994) 15 Co 
law 301. 
It will apply to all powers of directors, including, for example, the power to make calls on 
shares, to register shares, to declare a dividend, and to order the forfeiture of shares. 
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notwithstanding the alleged good faith of the directors.'*^ 
The relationship between the duty to act for a proper purpose, and the shareholders' 
ability to control the board, is shown in the decision of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd.'^^ In this case, the directors allotted shares in order to dilute the 
shareholding of the majority shareholder, enabling a third party to takeover the 
company. The allotment was set aside, the court holding that the power to allot shares 
was not exercised for a proper purpose. The Privy Council held that in order to 
establish whether a power was exercised properly, one had to consider, first, the 
nature of the power and the limits, i f any, placed on it, and, secondly, the substantial 
purpose for which the power was exercised. Once a cotirt has determined the scope of 
the power, and the substantial purpose for which it was exercised, the court will be 
able to judge, objectively, whether the power was exercised for a proper purpose. 
Much criticism has been levied at this judgment and exposition of the law.^ ^ In 
particular, the doctrine of "substantial purpose" has been criticised as being virtually 
impossible to define in any given circumstance. Further, it introduces a subjective 
element into the consideration of the exercise of the power which will be difficuh to 
challenge. Parkinson states that, other than in circumstances where there is a takeover 
bid outstanding, there will usually be a number of reasons why a particular course of 
action is taken, some of which may be improper purposes. However, the difficulties 
in defining which are improper purposes and, moreover, whether they are substantial, 
wi l l be considerable and results in boards of directors having "considerable freedom in 
practice to entrench their position without the need to seek shareholder consent".'^ ^ 
This is so notwithstanding the dictum of Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith v Ampol 
wherein he stated that it was "unconstitutional" for directors to use their powers to 
alter the majorities in the company, as to do so was to interfere with those elements of 
the company's constitution which are set against their powers.'*9 Such words are, in 
reality, empty words: directors have considerable latitude in the exercise of their 
powers, and whether or not a particular course of conduct is considered improper or 
not wi l l rarely be questioned. 
'*5 Piercy v Mills & Co Ltd, [1920] Ch 304; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd, [1967] Ch 254. 
'^ ^ [1974] A C 403. 
See, inter alia: Parkinson, supra note 3, at 137-151; Burridge, "Wrongfiil Rights Issues", 
(1981) 44 Modern Law Review 40; and. Birds, "Proper Purposes as a Head of Directors' Duties", 
(1974) 37 Modern Law Review 580. 
4^  Parkinson, supra note 3, at 144. 
'*9 SMpranote45. 
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2.3 The duty to act with skill and care 
The common law standard of skill and care demanded from directors was espoused in 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd.^^ The three basic components of the 
standard of skill and care to be exercised by a director were set out in Re City 
Equitable as follows: first, a director need not exhibit, in the performance of his or her 
duties, a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected of a person with that 
director's knowledge and experience; secondly, a director is not bound to give 
continuous attention to the affairs of the company but is bound to attend all meetings 
s/he reasonably can; and, thirdly, a director, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, is 
justified in trusting officials to perform duties honestly where s/he had allocated these 
duties properly, having regard to the exigencies of the business and to the Articles of 
Association. 
The law, as espoused in Re City Equitable gave rise to some remarkable decisions. 
For example, in Re Denham a "coimtry gentleman" was held not to be liable to the 
company for any breach of duty where he had failed to attend any board meetings for 
four years and had therefore failed to notice that the Chairman was falsifying the 
accounts.51 In Re Cardiff Savings Bank, the Marquis of Bute's Case, the Marquis of 
Bute, the President of the bank, escaped liability for the debts of the company despite 
having attended only one board meeting in thirty-eight years.^ 2 
The directors who were the subject of the above cases were not held to have breached 
their duties to the companies as the test of a directors' skill and care is subjective, and 
therefore variable depending upon the skill of the person concerned: "The director is 
obliged only to do as much as could be expected from someone as incompetent and 
foolish as he happens to be."53 Accordingly, it has been accurately stated that the 
"common law operates to give directors remarkable freedom to run companies 
incompetently". 5'* 
The reason for this seemingly lax standard of skill and care to be expected from a 
[1925] Ch 407. The position is no different for an executive director than a non-executive. In 
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing, [1989] B C L C 498, the argument that a lower standard of skill 
and care is required of a non-executive director was dismissed. 
51 [1883] 25 C h D 752. 
52 [1892] 2 Ch 100. 
53 Mackenzie, "A Company Director's Obligations of Skill and Care" (1982) Journal of Business 
Law 460, at 461. 
5" Finch, "Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?", (1992) 52 Modern Law 
Review 179, at 179. 
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director resuhs fi-om the fact that, until recentiy, the law continued to espouse the 
standard laid down in the nineteenth century, and early twentieth, when directors were 
not, on the whole, professional, fiill-time managers, but were part-time, well-meaning 
amateurs. In addition, at that time, it was considered that, as shareholders elected 
their directors, it was not up to the courts to impose a particular standard upon the 
directors so chosen.^ s 
As the conception of the company has developed beyond the narrow consideration of 
it as a playground for the investor, and amateur director, so the standard demanded of 
those involved in the management of companies has increased. The majority of 
executive directors are today employed by the company on terms specified in a 
contract of employment. Such executive directors are in a contractual relationship 
with the company; their standard of skill and care is regulated by the express and 
implied terms of the employment contract, as well as the common law standard 
considered above. Thus, as it is an implied term of all employment contracts that the 
employee exercise reasonable skill (an objective standard) in the performance of his or 
her duties56, the actions of an executive director will be measured on an objective 
standard. Moreover, a failure to exercise this degree of skill and care constitutes a 
breach of contract, which is enforceable via ordinary contractual principles. 
As a result of the contract of employment now governing the majority of directors' 
relationships with companies, the standard of skill and care expected from a director is 
more in line with the demands of a professional businessperson, rather than a well-
meaning amateur. However, the common law standard remains, and is a reflection of 
the law's attitude to directors, which remains of significance, as it continues to form 
the standard of a director who is not in a contractual relationship with the company. 
In recent years, this common law standard of skill and care has been made more 
objective, largely as a resuh of the impact of the wrongful trading provision in the 
Insolvency Act 1986.^ ^ 
The interpretation of section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 was considered in Re 
Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2), where Knox J stated that the consequence 
of the section was that there are "certain minimum standards" which a director must 
55 See Re New MashonalandExploration Co, [1892] 3 Ch 577, at 585 per Vaughan-Williams J; 
and, Turquandv Marshall, [1869] 4 Ch App 376, at 386,per Lord Hatherly LC. 
56 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd, [ 1957] AC 555. 
5'7 Particularly section 214. The Company Directors' Disqualification Act 1986 has also had an 
impact. 
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attain.58 Such minimum standards included, inter alia, the obligation to keep 
accounting records, lay them before the general meeting, and file them at Companies 
House. In Norman and another v Theodore Goddard (a firm) and others^^ a 
contribution was sought from a director on the basis that he had breached his duty of 
skill and care to the company. Hoffman J stated that "a director performing active 
duties on behalf of the company need not exhibit a greater degree of skill and care 
than may be reasonably expected from a person undertaking those dut ies" .He 
continued that the test of a director's skill and care is accurately stated in section 214 
of the Insolvency Act 1986. This standard is more demanding than Romer J's 
formulation in Re City Equitable. However, the deployment of the statutory standard 
is not all-encompassing: Hoffman J approved that part of Romer J's dictum in Re City 
Equitable Fire that "[bjusiness cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust".^' 
Accordingly, "men in responsible positions may be trusted imtil there is reason to 
distrust them".62 common law standard of the trusting, honest, "gentlemanly" 
conduct of a director still prevails. 
Norman v Theodore Goddard is a first instance decision, and moreover, one in which 
a thorough examination of the authorities was not undertaken, nor was there argument 
from opposing coimsel. However, the judgment was followed in Re D'Jan of London 
Ltd, Hoffman LJ giving judgment, who held that "the duty of care owed by a director 
at common law is accurately stated in section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986".63 
However, in this case, it was considered that the director could be relieved of 
responsibility under section 727 of the Companies Act which gives the court the 
power to relieve a director of liability for breaches of duty, including negligence, 
wholly or in part, i f the court considers that the director acted reasonably and ought 
fairly to be excused. Hoffman LJ pointed out the obvious ambiguity in finding a 
director negligent but to have acted reasonably '^*, but resolved this difficulty by 
reference to the fact that the section exists and therefore can presumably be used in the 
circumstances of the case. Finch points out that the effect of this discretion makes 
"the application of an uncertain rule [a director's duty of skill and care] yet more 
uncertain".65 
58 [1989] B C L C 520, at 550. 
59 [1991] B C L C 1028. 
60 IbidzXim. 
61 /AW at 1031. 
62 Ibid. 
63 [1993] BCC 646, at 648. 
64 Ibid iLi 649. 
65 S'Mpranote54, at201. 
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The impact of Norman v Theodore Goddard and Re D'Jan, together with the 
application of section 727, on the directors' duty of skill and care is unclear. The 
cases do mark a departure from the common law as it was understood, and recognise a 
need to update the law in line with current thinking. However, the application of 
section 727 reduces the impact of the advances made: it may be that the standard 
expected fi-om directors is higher, but the corollary is that they will be relieved of 
liability where, in previous times, they would not have been liable. The advance is 
one of form, but not yet of substance. 
2.4 The no-conflict rule 
A further duty imposed on directors is that they must not place themselves in a 
position where their personal interests are in conflict with the interests of company. 
This fiduciary duty arose from the concept of the director as trustee^ :^ a director is the 
keeper of the assets of the company which belong to others, and therefore the interests 
of the director must not come into conflict with the position of director. The rule was 
clearly set out in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros: 
It is a rule of universal application that no-one having such (fiduciary) duties 
to discharge shall be allowed to enter into an engagement in which he has or 
can have an interest conflicting or which may possibly conflict with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to protect.^^ 
The duty is strict: it wil l be sufficient that there is a "real possibility''^^ of a conflict, 
and the courts wil l not enquire as to the fairness, good faith or otherwise of the 
director.69 I f a director is placed in a position of conflict, any contract entered into as 
a result of the conflict wil l be voidable at the instance of the company. Further, the 
director may be called to account to the company for any gains. 
The strictness of the rule may be ameliorated in two ways. First, it was noted above 
that any contract concluded as a result of a conflict is voidable at the instance of the 
company. Accordingly, the company may ratify the contract by a resolution in 
general meeting, at which the director may vote in favour i f a shareholder. 
66 Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, pages 37-39; and, 
Sealy, supra note 1. 
67 [ 1854] 1 Macq 461, at 471 -472. This position was forcefully re-affirmed by the House of 
Lords in Guinness pic v Saunders, [1990] 2 AC 663. 
68 Boulting V ACTAT, [ 1963] 2 QB 606. 
69 Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros, supra note 67. 
''O North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty, [1887] 12 App Cas 589. 
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Secondly, the company may waive the no-conflict rule by, for example, a provision in 
its articles.'^i Such a general provision can be drafted so that each contract does not 
have to be put before the general meeting; directors merely discloses their interests to 
the board and are thereby not prevented from being a party to a transaction. Such an 
ability to "contract out"'2 of fiduciary obligation is, however, robustiy policed by 
the courts. 
In Guinness pic v Saunders'^^, the House of Lords was faced with a claim from a 
director for remuneration which was granted to him by a committee of directors in 
circumstances where his personal interests were in conflict with those of the company. 
The House of Lords endorsed the strictness of the no-conflict rule; directors are 
precluded from entering into contracts for their services with the company except in 
circumstances authorised by the articles. Moreover, where a contract was entered into 
which was not so authorised, the director would not be entitied to remvineration by 
way of a quantum meruit J'^ Accordingly, the director was not entitled to any 
remuneration. Thus, no encouragement is to be given to directors who may breach the 
no-conflict rule by allowing them an equitable allowance. 
Disclosure of conflicts of interest is also required by section 317 of the Companies 
Act. This provides that disclosure must be made to the board of any contract or 
proposal in which they are interested. Although a director who has a conflicting 
interest must disclose .it under this section on pain of a fine^5^ disclosure in this 
manner does not have the same effect as a disclosure pursuant to an article in the form 
of article 85 of Table A. Thus, a contract would remain voidable at the behest of the 
company. 
It can be seen that on its face, the no-conflict rule is extremely strict. However, in 
practice, disclosure is only made to the board, and directors frequently have an interest 
in transactions with the company. Indeed, it is commonplace for directors to be on the 
board of other companies; the companies involved considering that there is a benefit 
to each company in doing so. Thus, there is a conflict in the policy of the law itself 
The strict no-conflict rule first arose as a means of protecting the interests of 
1^ See, for example. Table A, paragraph 85. 
2^ Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, supra note 29, at 405. 
•^ 3 Supra note 67. 
'^* The House of Lords distinguished Boardman v Phipps, [1967] 2 AC 46, on the basis that an 
equitable allowance would be granted where the policy of the rule, the discouragement of fiduciaries 
being put in a position where their interests conflict, is not threatened. 
•^ 5 Section 317(7) of the Companies Act. 
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shareholders, borrowed from the equitable duties of trustees, and is therefore strict. 
However, as commerce has developed and become ever more competitive, it has been 
understood that the strict application of the rule may not be in the interests of 
shareholders: giving directors greater freedom may allow them to manage the 
company in a more productive and competitive manner. Thus, the protection of 
shareholders has been reduced, and, in its place, reliance is placed on the personal 
interests of directors coinciding with the interests of the company. 
2.5 The duty not to profit from the position of director 
Allied to the no-conflict rule is the duty not to profit from the office of director, 
except in express circumstances. This duty is similar to that of the no-conflict rule as 
it arises from the equitable considerations of the director as controller of a third party's 
assets, who must not profit from his or her position of guardianship. The rule is strict, 
although a liberalisation can be discerned from the recent case law. 
The rule is also characterised as the rule that directors must not appropriate corporate 
opportunities. It is considered that a corporate opportunity is an asset of the company, 
and therefore were directors to appropriate the opportunity without authority, i.e. 
exploit it themselves, directors would be benefiting from the position of director and 
from the assets of the company, when any such benefits should, in fact, belong to the 
company. Liability has been based on a very strict capacity approach; i f the director 
came across the information, the opportunity, in the capacity of director, then the 
director wi l l be liable to account to the company for any profit subsequently made by 
the personal exploitation of the opportunity. 
The locus classicus is Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver''^ where the directors of the 
company invested personally in an enterprise in which the company was involved. 
The directors committed personal funds to the venture at a time when the company 
had no fiirther funds, and, were the venture to go ahead, the company, as its 
investment stood, would make substantial sums of money. The directors were, 
therefore, not appropriating an opportunity which could have been the company's. 
Herein lies the strictness of the judgment; it did not matter that the company could not 
have pursued the opportunity any further, the mere fact that the directors put 
themselves in a position to benefit personally from an activity which came their way 
as directors was sufficient to establish a liability to account for the profits of the 
•76 [1942] 1 All ER 378. 
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venture to the company. 
The uncompromising position taken in Regal Hastings was confirmed in Industrial 
Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley'^^ where a director was involved in negotiating 
a contract for the company. The third party to the contract indicated to the director 
that it would not grant the contract to the company, but would consider granting it to 
the director in his personal capacity. The director resigned from his position as 
director, and was subsequentiy awarded the contract. The director was held liable to 
account to the company for any profits, it being held that, as a director, he had only 
one capacity, that of director of the company. 
It was noted above that this strict position arises from the conceptualisation of the 
director as trustee, and therefore a sfrict standard of conduct is expected from a 
director, at the expense of individual innovation and risk-taking. In recent years, in 
the spirit of enterprise and liberalisation, inroads have been made into the strict 
application of the no-profit rule. 
A number of Commonwealth cases have liberalised the rule^^^ and in Island Export 
Finance Ltd v Umunna'^^ a more flexible approach was taken by the English courts. In 
Island Export, a director resigned because of general dissatisfaction with the 
company. He was later awarded a contract, which the company with which he had 
previously been engaged, had been pursuing. It was held that the director had not 
appropriated a "maturing business opportunity", and was not therefore liable to 
account to the company for any profits.^" Accordingly, where there is a lapse of time 
between a director leaving a company, and pursuing a corporate opportunity, the no-
profit rule has no place, and the director no longer has only the one capacity of 
director. 
The approach of the court in Island Export reflects a more liberal interpretation of 
directors' duties, sacrificing corporate, and therefore shareholder, protection, for the 
greater benefit to society by allowing the most advantageous exploitation of resources. 
This is a similar argument to the one raised in connection with the market for 
corporate control.^i In Chapter One it was noted that the market for corporate control 
77 [1972] 2 All E R 162. 
78 See, for example, Canadian Aero Services v O'Malley, supra note 1; and Queensland Mines 
Ltd V Hudson, [1978] 52 ALJR 399. 
79 [1986] B C L C 460. 
80 Thus, following the earlier case of Canadian Aero Services v O'Malley, supra note 1. 
81 See Chapter One. 
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may have adverse effects on third parties, but proponents of the market argue that this 
is not as important as securing, by the market, the optimum allocation of resources. 
Similarly, although one company may suffer i f a corporate opportunity is appropriated 
from it, the economy as a whole will benefit as the person best placed to exploit the 
opportunity is allowed to do so. 
3. The enforcement of directors' duties 
Clearly, without adequate enforcement measures, the duties considered above would 
be all but mere exhortations. The following section will consider the ability of 
shareholders to enforce directors' duties.82 Thus, the rule of Foss v Harbottle, and its 
exceptions, will be considered, followed by an examination of the alternative means 
by which shareholders can seek redress for a breach of duty. 
3.1 The rule in Foss v Harbottle 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle is complex and confused, and has largely been replaced 
as an effective means of redress by the remedies available to shareholders in section 
459 applications.83 Accordingly, the nature of the remedy available by means of the 
derivative action wil l only be briefly considered. ^ 4 
The fiduciary duties of directors are, with limited exceptions, duties owed to the 
company. Accordingly, the proper plaintiff for taking any action in respect of a 
breach of duty is the company. This is the orthodox position as stated in Foss v 
Harbottle.^^ However, the decision as to whether to commit the company to legal 
action is a management decision, within the purview of the board of directors.86 
Accordingly, where it is one of the directors, or the directors as a whole, who are 
alleged to have breached their duties, it can be seen that it would be exfremely 
surprising were the board itself to commence legal action against the director, or the 
board of directors as a whole. Thus, should a shareholder wish to commence such 
action, s/he must come within one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, of 
82 Although sections 431, 432, 447 and 460 grant powers to governmental agencies to 
investigate the affairs of companies and take appropriate action, these are rarely utilised and will not be 
considered further here. See Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, supra note 29, at 509-519. 
83 See Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, 5th ed, at 
643-672. 
8^* See fiirther the references cited m Chapter One, note 24. 
85 [1843] 2 Hare 461. 
86 Whether there is a right for the general meeting to commence action is a moot point: see 
Wedderbum, "Control of Corporate Litigation", (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 327. 
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which there are four: first, where the transaction is ultra vires; secondly, where the 
transaction requires a special majority; thirdly, where the transaction infringes the 
personal rights of the shareholder; and, fourthly, where the transaction amounts to a 
fraud on the minority. Where the action contemplated is a breach of fiduciary duty, it 
is the fourth exception which is relevant.87 A fraud on the minority occurs, broadly, 
where there is "wrongdoer control". In other words, where the directors, who may be 
the subject of the enquiry, are in control of the board and thereby prevent the company 
taking action. 
The use of the derivative action has all but been forgotten. In Prudential Assurance 
Co Ltd V Newman Industries Ltd^^, a derivative action was brought by a large 
institutional investor, in an attempt to seek redress for the company from a director. 
The action by the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd was a failure and is thought to have 
sounded the death knell for the derivative action: i f a large instimtional shareholder, 
with experience and resources, cannot bring a successful action, what hope is there for 
an individual shareholder. There have been a number of actions since the Prudential 
case89, but the use of the remedies and procedure available by a section 459 unfair 
prejudice petition are now more usual. 
3.2 Section 459 and unfair prejudice 
Section 459 of the Companies Act provides a remedy to shareholders who can prove 
that the company's affairs have been or are about to be conducted in a manner which 
is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally. Under section 461 of 
the Companies Act, the court has extensive jurisdiction to take such action as it thinks 
fit to remedy the situation. The section 459 jurisdiction has given rise to a substantial 
case law which is currentiy being interpreted widely, and allows remedies for actions 
which previously came solely within the preserve of the derivative action.9o Actions 
have been successful where a director appropriated company property'i; where a 
corporate opportxmity was appropriated92; and, diversion of corporate busuiess93. 
87 For a consideration of the other exceptions, see Farrar, Furey and Hannigan, supra note 29, at 
442-462. 
88 [1980] 2 All ER 841. 
89 For example. Smith v Croft, [1988] Ch 114, Taylor v NUM, [1985] B C L C 237. 
90 The fact that a shareholder could have a remedy by means of a derivative action, does not 
prevent action being taken under section 459: Re A Company (no 005287 of 1985), [1986] 2 All ER 
253. See further Gower, supra note 83. 
91 Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd, 13 January 1982, unreported. 
92 Re Cumana Ltd, [1986] 2 BCC 99. 
93 Re London School of Electronics Z^ c?, [ 1986] Ch 211. 
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Following the increasing use of section 459, in Re Elgindata Ltd it was stated that "it 
is open to the court to find that serious mismanagement of a company's business 
constitutes conduct that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the minority 
shareholders".94 However, the court noted that it would be "reluctant" to come to this 
conclusion.95 To date, the section 459 jurisdiction has been mostly utilised by small 
private companies, quasi-partnerships, which cannot have recourse to the open market 
for the sale of their shares. However, the jurisdiction is not confined to such 
companies.96 
Nonetheless, the fiiture of the section 459 jurisdiction is not clear. Whether the courts 
in section 459 applications will continue to be liberal in their interpretation of the 
section remains to be seen.97 
C. Conclusions: Directors' Duties as a Means of Controlling 
Directorial Conduct 
Section B above considered the nature of directors' fiduciary duties, in whose interests 
they are to be exercised, and their enforcement. The variety of interests for whom 
directors must act accords directors substantial freedom of action. A director's duty 
not to profit from the office of director, not to have conflicting interests, and to act for 
proper purposes, are all protean concepts which are open to abuse: it would be 
difficult to dispute what is a substantial purpose and what is not; conflicts can easily 
be approved by a clause in the articles; and, the corporate opportunity doctrine is 
becoming more market orientated. Each of these advances are not of themselves 
adverse for shareholders. Indeed, they can bring increased competitiveness and 
financial rewards: a director may usefully exploit personal contacts for the benefit of 
the company; a director may bring a corporate opportunity to one company, although 
having taken it from another; and, a director may act to prevent a takeover which 
would resuh in substantial job losses. However, with all such potential benefits, come 
increased risks. As the controls in the form of directors' duties are reduced, so 
directors have the potential to benefit substantially the company, but also to ruin it. It 
is suggested that the changes in the nature of directors' duties which are evidenced by 
94 [1991] B C L C 959, at 993. 
95 Ibid at 993. 
96 See further Riley, "Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985 and the Role of the Courts", (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 782. 
97 Ibid. 
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the case law are a result of an increasing application of market analysis to corporate 
activity, bringing with it inherent unpredictability. 
There have been regular calls for the reform of directors' duties. In particular, the 
codification of directors' duties has been advocated. An attempt was made in 1978 to 
introduce a codification into the Companies Act 1980, but this proved abortive. 
However, it is not clear that codification would bring advantages.^ * As discussed 
above, that directors have considerable discretion may be beneficial. More fruitful 
analysis has therefore centred on the reform of particular standards expected of 
directors, in particular the standard of skill and care. Finch argues that "in an era of 
full-time directors and rising standards of commercial education, the standards of skill 
required from directors could well be raised''.^ *? The Cadbury Report'^o welcomed the 
preparation of a course by the Institute of Directors to be run for newly appointed 
directors'01, and the existence of many such courses in the business schools around the 
country, concluding that: "it is highly desirable that [directors] should imdertake 
some form of internal or external training".•"2 The Cadbury Report continues that the 
"training and development of directors is of importance to good governance". "^ 3 
As long ago as 1961, Professor Gower advocated an objective standard against which 
a director's performance was to be measured, Gower stated that: "As the business 
world comes to expect higher standards, the law should develop in step. What has 
handicapped legal development so far has been the failure of the courts to recognise 
that "directing" is becoming a profession with developing standards of expertise. 
Finch argues that an objective standard is required but one that "does not chill 
enterprise and which does not discourage directors form seeking to improve their own 
level of skills". She suggests the following: a director should exhibit the skill and 
care reasonably to be expected of a person who has undertaken their kmd of role in 
their kind of company. Such a test is intended to retain flexibility of interpretation. 
98 See Birds, "Making Directors Do Their Duties", (1980) 1 Company Lawyer 67, at 67. 
99 Finch, supra note 54, at 179. 
Cadbury Committee, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992. 
101 /A/c/paragraph 4.19. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid paragraph 4.20. See T/ze Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1995, which reported that the 
Institute of Management report had proposed the establishment of an independent "college of 
directors". The college would be established to "promote and maintain the highest standards of 
directorship and corporate governance", and its central responsibility would be to foster training for 
directors. 
104 Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Company Law of Ghana, 1961. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Supra note 54, at 202-204. 
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and to be applied fairly to the different size and type of company covered. It is 
suggested that reform of this nature would be a welcome change in the law, reflecting 
the significant part which directors play in the success of the economy as a whole, and 
the responsibility attached to their position. 
Allied to such reforms, must be reform of the means by which directors' duties are 
enforced. The present law is loaded against the shareholder, individual or institution. 
The law of the derivative action is detailed and complex, and as a result has been 
largely avoided in recent years by the increasing use of section 459 of the Companies 
Act. Gower confirms that the detailed twisting and turning of the case law of the 
derivative action is "needed no longer". A more appropriate method of 
enforcement would come in the form of the draft f if th EC Directive on Company Law, 
i f it is ever enacted. The draft f i f th directive provides that shareholders may bring 
an action against a company i f they hold 10% of the nominal share capital of the 
company, or such lower percentage as legislation may provide. Parkinson welcomes 
the enactment of a provision such as that in the draft f i f th EC Company Law 
Directive, but argues that the percentage should be as low as 5%.^^^ As Finch states, 
such a statutory right would overcome the problems of the restrictive rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and enable shareholders to take effective action against errant directors. 
Accordingly, the results of the Law Commission's inquiry into shareholders' rights 
and remedies, which was announced by the Government in January 1995, is eagerly 
awaited."' 
This chapter has considered the part played by the fiduciary duties imposed on 
directors as a means of controlling their conduct. The duties were termed external 
controls in the introduction of this chapter, as they are imposed on companies from 
the outside, and are not concerned with the internal regulation of the company, nor 
with the (in)activity of shareholders. However, it can be seen that the efficacy of 
directors duties are to a large extent dependent on shareholder activity, because of the 
predominant belief that the appropriate persons to take such action against directors, 
and therefore to control corporate property are the shareholders. The ability and 
utility of this form of shareholder governance and democracy will be considered in 
detail in Chapter Four. However, it is noted here that the controls which shareholders 
107 5Mjt7ranote83, at603. 
'08 O J C 1983 No 24012, as amended, see D T I , Amended proposal for a fifth directive on the 
harmonisation of company law in the EC: A Consultative Document, 1990. 
'09 Supra note 3, at 257. 
"0 note 54, at 204. 
' ' ' See British Chamber of Commerce's Business Briefing, 13 January 1995. 
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are supposed to effect and utilise have become increasingly lax, with more discretion 
being given to directors. This means that, taken together with the increasing futility 
and inhibiting factors relating to shareholder action, the controls are being weakened, 
and shareholders are having to rely more on hope that on power. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
A. Introduction 
Chapter One considered the means by which the conduct of directors is controlled by 
the operation of the markets for corporate control, products and managerial talent. 
Although it was noted that such markets do exert an influence on directorial conduct, 
they are also associated with a number of costs; compliance costs and third party 
costs. In this light, Chapter Two examined a number of prophylactic controls which 
are intended to influence directorial conduct, together with their associated 
enforcement mechanisms and remedies. It was found that such controls are a 
fundamental part of the company law regime, but that, although such powers gave 
directors remarkable freedom to act in a manner which may benefit a company, such 
freedom also gives the opportunity to act in ways detrimental to a company's interests. 
Accordingly, this chapter wil l consider a further means by which directorial conduct 
may be regulated, by means of the structure and composition of the board of directors. 
The board of directors is the situs of the management of the company. The authority 
to manage is delegated to the board by the shareholders, whose control thereover is 
limited. 1 The reform of the structure of the board of directors is concerned with the 
internal composition of the company; reforming company structure as a means of 
ensuring that conduct which is sought to be avoided does not take place. Thus, the 
reforms are preventative, and are intended to engender a particular, accountable and 
responsive, form of management. 
The focus of this chapter wil l be the proposals for the reform of the structure of the 
board of directors which have emanated from the European Union, and fi"om a number 
of ad hoc non-governmental organisations in the UK. The European Union first 
promulgated reform of the board of directors in 1972, as a measure essential to the 
1 Delegation by the shareholders to the board of directors of the management function is usual 
by means of an article similar to that in Table A, article 70. O f course, a company may choose not to 
be managed m this manner, although such companies are unusual. For a discussion of the ability of 
shareholders to control the board of directors, see Chapter Four. 
common market.^ Influenced by the European proposal, the UK Government set up a 
committee to examine potential means of reforming the structure of boards.^  
However, with the change of government in 1979, the debate on the reform of the 
board of directors, at least in the UK, died.'^  However, notwithstanding the view of 
the UK Government, increasing pressure in the late 1980s over concern about certain 
aspects of corporate governance, led to the establishment of the Cadbury Committee 
by the financial institutions of the City.^ The remit of the Cadbury Committee was to 
"help raise the standards of corporate governance''^, in the light of the "continued 
concern about the standards of financial reporting and accountability, heightened by 
BCCI, Maxwell and the controversy over directors' pay".'' In addition, and perhaps a 
recognition of the failings of the Cadbury Report, the UK Government, together with 
the Confederation of British Industry ('CBI') also established the Greenbury 
Committee which reported on the means by which companies should regulate the 
remimeration of senior corporate executives.^ 
Debate continues, not least because the draft f i f th EC company law directive has yet 
to be implemented, and the Cadbury Committee Mark 2 is expected to meet and 
produce another report during 1996/7.^ It is therefore timely to examine the reform 
proposals noted above, the impact of the reforms which have been made, and future 
possibilities for the reform of the board of directors. 
2 OJ L 131/72, 13 December 1972. 
^ Report of the Committee on Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, Cmnd 6706, 1977, chaired by 
Lord Bullock. 
4 See Wedderbum, "Trust, the Worker and the Law", (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
pages 243-244: "By 1980 ... the "industrial democracy" debate in Britain was silent." 
^ The Cadbury Committee was established in May 1991, under the chair of Adrian Cadbury, by 
the Fmancial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the Accounting Standards Board. 
The Committee reported on 1 December 1992, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
6 Dine, 'The Governance of Governance', (1994) 15 Co Law 73, at 73. 
^ Cadbury Report, supra note 5, at 9. 
8 The report, Directors' Remuneration - Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury, was published on 17th July 1995, and offered a Code of Practice to govern remuneration 
issues. See infra. 
9 Paragraph 3.12 of the Cadbury Report, supra note 5. The next committee has been 
established and is due to produce an interim report by mid-1997, followed by a fmal report at the end 
of 1997. See The Times, 21 February 1996. 
48 
B. Board Structure and the Influence of Europe 
1. The draft Fifth E C Company Law Directive 
The first proposals emanating from the European Union regarding the reform of the 
board of directors of public companies came in 1972 with the proposal for a fifth 
company law directive, lo As a result of harsh criticism of the proposal, it was 
reformed in 1983ii, and again in 1989.12 The EC was, and remains, of the view that 
the coordination of the laws relating to public companies is an essential prerequisite to 
the achievement of a common market, and the proposed reforms must be seen in this 
context. Thus, the reforms proposed owe more to the general objective of 
harmonizing the laws of the Member States of the Community, that to ensuring that 
the conduct of directors is appropriately regulated and controlled. Notwithstanding 
this caveat, the proposed fifth EC Company Law Directive has much to offer the UK. 
The first draft of the directive proposed the levelling-up of the structure of the board 
of directors to that in place in Germany, thus the 1972 draft provided for a mandatory 
two-tier structure for public companies. Amidst much criticism, particularly from the 
UK Government, the draft was amended and has now "moved a long way from its 
very rigid and germanic original formulation".i^ The latest text provides that 
companies wi l l have the choice of a two-tier or unitary board structure, the preamble 
to the draft directive noting that the "general introduction of the two-tier system on a 
compulsory basis is for the time being impracticable though such systems should be 
made generally available at least as an option for public limited companies".i"* The 
two-tier scheme provides for management by the management organ, under the 
supervision of the supervisory organ. The management organ, the board of directors, 
wi l l have responsibility for day to day management of the company and will be 
appointed by and accountable to the supervisory board. Employee participation is 
mandatory and may take one of three forms: one third to one half of the supervisory 
board are to be appointed by the employees, where it is the latter, the voting 
1 0 Supra note 2. See also Clough, 'Trying to Make the Fifth Directive Palatable', (1982) 3 Co 
Law 109, at 110, where he states that: "It is rumoured that the [draft fifth company law] Directive owes 
its existence to a bargain struck between the Germans and the British during the negotiations for 
British entry to the Community whereby the Germans agreed to the Regional Fund in exchange for 
acceptances by the other states of a Directive on company structure and employee representation." 
1 1 Document 1-862/81, 15 January 1983. 
1 2 The proposed amendments to the draft appear in DTI Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive 
on the harmonisation of Company Law in the European Community: A Consultative Document, 1990. 
13 Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality, Sweet & Maxwell 1984, at 82. 
1^  Supra note 2, preamble. 
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procedures are to ensure that the decisions are uttimately taken by the members 
appointed by the general meeting'^; a body representing the employees shall have a 
right to regular information and consultation on, inter alia, the administration, 
situation, progress and prospects of the company; and, employee participation through 
collectively agreed systems, ie. the right to appoint the supervisory board, information 
via the body representing the employees, or the right to object to the appointment of 
persons to the supervisory board. 
The proposed unitary board would delegate management to executive members of the 
board, being less in number than the other directors. Employee participation in the 
unitary board can also take three forms: employees shall appoint between one third 
and one half of the members of the unitary board; employee representation through a 
body representing company employees; and employee participation through 
collectively agreed systems. 
Under the present form of the draft directive, UK companies would be able to 
maintain their imitary boards, the two-tier structure being an option where preferred. 
Indeed, employee participation on the unitary board is not mandated. The least 
obtrusive form of employee participation could be implemented, either through an 
"organ representing the company" or through "collectively agreed systems". The 
board would still be appointed by the general meeting, although there must be a 
number of non-executives, divisible by three, who are to appoint a smaller number of 
executives. Indeed, for "many public listed companies this combination of permitted 
Fifth Directive models would involve little change in either the existing law or in 
board practice as far as board structure was concerned".'^ 
Nonetheless, the UK Government, and employers organizations in the UK, including 
'^ Hopt, "New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor 
Representation on Corporate Boards", (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1138, at 1346, states that the 
provision granting ultimate supremacy to employees was included so that the model would be 
compatible with the German Constitution. The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy, supra note 3, 
stated that it would be "illogical and frustrating", to the true object of industrial democracy to put 
employees onto the board but allow shareholders to retain ultimate control, chapter 8 paragraph 34. To 
alleviate these difficulties the Bullock Report recommended that the composition of the board should 
be divided equally between employee representatives, shareholders' representatives and independent 
directors. 
'^ Boyle, 'Draft Fifth Du-ective: Implications for Director's Duties, Board Structure and 
Employee Participation', (1991) 13 Co Law 6. See also: Andenas, 'The Future of E C Company Law 
Harmonisation', (1994) 15 Co Law 121, at 122, who states that "m the Commission's amended proposal 
the provisions about board structure will not require major change m U K corporate practices"; Welch, 
"The Draft Fifth Directive - A False Dawn?", (1983) 8 European law Review 83. 
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the CBI, remain opposed to the proposals contained in the draft fifth directive, even 
though "in theory, the functions of the supervisory board mirror those of the ideal 
unitary board described in the CBI's booklet on the responsibilities of the British 
public company".I'' The UK Government's objections continue despite the fact that 
the draft directive in its present form would little alter the structure and business of 
UK companies. Moreover, it has expressed the belief that the contents of the directive 
fall under the protean concept of "subsidiarity", thus raising a whole new 
constitutional diversion to the debate, moving away from the actual proposals and the 
problems which initially motivated reform.i^ The UK Government's objections would 
appear to be more ideological than particular; it is likely that whatever the form of the 
proposal, they wil l not be accepted by an UK Government opposed to any form, 
however anodyne, of compulsory employee participation in the supervision of 
management. 
However, as was suggested above, the proposals could offer useful alternatives to the 
present corporate structures employed in the UK. The arguments against the 
proposals are wide-ranging. It is argued that sectional representatives of the 
supervisory board wil l inevitably look to their constituency for support and guidance 
and thus, at worst, deadlock may result; at best, the interests of the company will not 
be followed, but, rather, a range of sectional preferences. In particular, it is argued 
that employee directors, particularly those without the support of a works council or 
similar organisation, will lack an effective support and training. Further, conflicts 
may arise between a works council and the traditional UK machinery of collective 
bargaining, leading to subsequent problems between non-union and union 
representatives. Moreover, the impact which employee representatives can have on a 
unitary board is negligible. 
On the other hand, proponents of the two-tier board argue that allowing a unitary 
board is a negation of the intention to improve governance. A unitary board cannot 
hope to have the range of expertise available to the two-tier board, and, as 
management is delegated to executives, the unitary board has no mechanism by which 
to monitor the executives. In addition, as the responsibility of the executive board and 
the supervisory board are clearly identified, governance will be less haphazard, and 
more thorough. It is recognised that it is executives who effectively manage the 
company, but with a supervisory board, that management is more closely and openly 
I ' ' Welch,/6/t/at 31. 
1 ^  See Agence Europe, 7/8 December 1992. 
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supervised. A supervisory board can provide an appropriate forum for the airing of 
the views of those involved in the company, as opposed to the limited interests and 
perspectives of those on the unitary board of directors. Such a forum would improve 
the consultation and information processes of the company which would contribute to 
improving the management of companies. 
The unifying concern is that the large company has an increasingly complex 
management structure which ensures that an outsider, a non-executive director or 
employee representative, has difficulty in becoming "sufficiently familiar with the 
intricacies of the business to ask the right questions at the right time".'^ However, the 
present structure of UK company boards, the unitary board comprising executive and 
non-executive directors, is that which has presided over the notable failures of 
corporate governance which have caused the public debate, and the establishment of 
the various committees of inquiry noted above. In this context, the proposals 
contained in the draft f i f th directive represent a variety of ways in which the present 
concerns could be counteracted, and, in time, alleviated. However, without greater 
encouragement and interest in adopting new ways of governance, the enactment of the 
draft f i f th directive would likely see very little change in the UK as companies seek to 
do as little as necessary to implement the directive. 
2. Works councils and corporate governance 
The influence of the European Union extends not only to the structure of the board of 
directors, but to reforms aimed at improving the management structure of companies 
as a whole. Such reforms have primarily come in the form of measures to improve the 
information, consultation and participation of employees in the undertakings in which 
they are employed. The objective of these particular reforms is to improve the quality 
of decision making in enterprises by including, and taking into account, the views of 
the representatives of employees. In so doing, it is considered that the governance of 
the company wil l improve as management has to consider a wider range of opinions, 
which, together with the knowledge that consultation is mandatory, with penatties for 
enforcement, wi l l lead to a change in attitudes and decisions altered: management will 
be accountable for their decisions. 
The information and consultation of employees is piece-meal but ever growing. There 
are provisions mandating information and consultation in the following 
' 9 Welch, supra note 16, at 99. 
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circumstances: on the transfer of an undertaking^O; where large scale redundancies are 
proposed^i; on all questions relating to the health and safety of workers22; and, on all 
transnational issues affecting employees.23 The directives require, inter alia, 
consultation with a view to reaching agreement, and thus involve the management of a 
company to an important extent. Moreover, there are substantial penalties in the some 
cases for a refusal to consult. 
These directives have had the most impact in Member States, such as the UK, where 
works councils, or other representative bodies, are not already established as an 
integral part of corporate governance and activity. The impact in the UK is 
particularly acute because of the Government's ideological opposition to any 
mandatory involvement of employees in the management of companies.^ ^ As a result 
of such opposition, the UK Government failed to implement effectively the Acquired 
Rights and Collective Redundancies directives, resulting in the Commission taking 
action against the Government which was upheld by the European Court in June 
1994.25 The judgment of the European Court has yet to be implemented in the UK. 
Although the circumstances in which management must consult employees are 
increasing, it should be emphasised that the directives do only provide for the 
information and consultation of employees; although the rejected draft Fifth Company 
Law Directive, and the proposal for a European Company^ ,^ both included proposals 
for the participation of employees in the management of companies. Further, the 
Vredling directive, rejected by Member States, would have established works councils 
in all multinational corporations.^^ Information and consultation procedures do not 
restrict the management prerogative to listen and then ignore. As one senior UK 
20 The Acquired Rights Directive, 77/187/EEC. 
21 The Collective Redundancies Directive, 75/129/EEC. 
22 The Health and Safety Framework Directive, 89/391/EC. 
23 The European Works Councils Directive, OJ L 254/64, 30.9.94. It should be noted that the 
Works Council Directive does not apply to the U K , although an increasing number of U K companies 
are choosing voluntarily to adopt the provisions of the directive. See McGlynn, 'European Works 
Councils: Towards Industrial Democracy?', (1995) 24 Industrial Law Journal 78 and The Times, 9 
January 1995. 
24 ^Mpranote 11. 
25 Commission v United Kingdom, [1994] I R L R 392. The European Court held that the U K had 
failed to implement the directives by not providing a mechanism for the consultation of employees in 
the circumstances set out in the directives; the U K had chosen to rely on the voluntary (on the part of 
the employer) mechanism of recognition of trade unions. This had the effect of denying the benefit of 
the directives to those employees who either were not union members, or who, though a member of a 
union, were members of unions not recognised by the employer. See further, Davies, "A Challenge to 
Single Channel", (1994) 23 Industrial Law Journal 272. 
26 D T I , A Consultative Document, Revised Proposal for a European Company Statute, 1992. 
27 OJ 1983 C 2 I 7 . 
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director has stated, "[w]e wil l be able to manage the system so that it has relatively 
little impact".28 Thus, although the growth of a system of employee information and 
consuhation may lead to greater "industrial citizenship"29, unless employees become 
involved in the decision making fimctions of the enterprise, no significant 
improvements in terms of governance and accountability will be made in the short 
term. In the longer term, the directives do provide a mechanism by which greater 
employee participation in the management of companies could prove successful.^ o 
Moreover, it may be that the increasing participation of employees in corporate 
management acts as a spur to shareholders to increase their activity and involvement 
in the management of companies. 
C. The Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance 
1. Background 
It was noted above that the Cadbury Cormnittee was set up in 1991 in an attempt to 
counteract the increasingly critical adverse publicity regarding standards of corporate 
governance.^' It became the focus of attention in public debate^ ^^  principally because 
it was evident that there would be no governmental action on corporate governance. 
The report of the Cadbury Committee was primarily concerned with the financial 
aspects of corporate governance, but a substantial part of the report addressed the 
board of directors, its composition, and the committees which should form a part of 
the governance function. It is these aspects of the report which will be the focus of 
this section. However, in order that an accurate assessment can be made of the 
proposals, the underlying bases of the report will be outlined. 
The introduction to the report states that the "basic system of corporate governance in 
Britain is sound".^ 3 Thus, from the very outset, radical change was never envisaged. 
The introduction continues that its proposals aim to "strengthen the unitary board 
system and increase its effectiveness, not replace it".^^ Thus, the supervisory 
28 Quoted in the Financial Times, 20 April 1994. 
29 McGlynn, supra note 23, at 84. 
30 /Z)/J at 82-84. 
3' See text accompanying note 5. 
32 The chau- of the Cadbury Committee, Adrian Cadbury, stated in the preface to the report, at 9, 
that the committee "became the focus of far more attention than I ever envisaged when I accepted the 
invitation to become its chairman". 
33 Supra note 5, paragraph 1.7. 
3'' Ibid paragraph 1.8. This statement was included as a result of the criticism of the published 
draft report. See Dine, supra note 6. 
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mechanisms of two-tier boards, such as those of the European Community Member 
States were not under consideration. The approach of the report is "based on 
compliance with a voluntary code coupled with disclosure", which, it is argued, "will 
prove more effective than a statutory code".35 It is for shareholders to ensure 
compliance with the terms of the report, and it is "such market-based regulation" to 
which the Committee is looking to turn its proposals into action.36 Thus, there will be 
no compunction on companies to adopt the recommendations of the report, other than 
a requirement to state in their armual accounts whether or not they are complying with 
the report's Code of Best Practice.37 Finally, the introduction contains the disclaimer 
that "no system of control can eliminate the risk of fraud without so shackling 
companies as to impede their ability to compete in the market place".38 The proposals 
made by the report each have a varying status. There are general comments, 
recommendations, and the provisions of the Code of Best Practice. It is only 
compliance with the Code of Best Practice, compliance with which is required to be 
disclosed in company's annual accounts. 
2. The composition of the board of directors 
The Cadbury Report begins by stating that "[e]very public company should be headed 
by an effective board".39 Such an effective board is to be made up of executive and 
non-executive directors, and a chair. Domination of the board by one individual is 
said to be contrary to good governance and something that shareholders should 
avoid.40 The two principal recommendations of the Report, in respect of the 
composition of an effective board, are that the positions of chief executive and chair 
should not be held by the one person'", and that there should be a sufficient number of 
non-executive directors whose calibre will be such that they carry significant weight, 
and a majority of whom are to be independent of the company.^ ^ It is further 
35 Supra note 5, paragraph 1.10. 
36 Ibid paragraph 6.16. 
3'^  See The London Stock Exchange Admission of Securities for Listing, rule 12.43(j). It should 
be emphasised that the listing rules do not require a company to comply with the Cadbury Code of Best 
Practice. It merely requires that companies state whether they are complying or not. Note that the 
Confederation of British Industry, when responding to a query as to whether it considered compliance 
with the Cadbury Code of Best Practice should be a listing requirement of the Stock Exchange, it stated 
that this "could lead to excessive bureaucracy". In other words, compliance should not be mandatory. 
38 Swpra note 5, paragraph 1.9. 
39 Supra note 5, paragraph 4.1. 
40 Ibid paragraph 4.2. 
4' paragraph 4.9. 
42 Ibid paragraphs 4.11 and 4.12. Note that it is not a requirement that all non-executives are 
independent of the company. Accordingly, it is presumed by Cadbury that a previous executive 
director, for example, will be an effective check on the governance of the company. 
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recommended that non-executives are appointed for a fixed term.^ ^ However, it is 
only "good practice", not a recommendation, that there be a minimum of three non-
executive directors, that they be appointed by a nomination committee'*'*, and that they 
have the same access to information as executive directors.'i5 
Non-executive directors form a fundamental part of the Cadbury recommendations. 
They are to be the main players in the various committees to be established by a 
Cadbury company; namely, the remuneration, nomination, and audit committees.i^ 
Further, non-executives are to review the performance of the board'i^ , are to take a 
lead when potential conflicts of interest arise^ ,^ and are to "bring an independent 
judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key 
appointments, and the standards of conduct".'*^ The conclusion of the Report states 
that the "key safeguards" of sound corporate governance include "properly constituted 
boards".50 However, as noted above, the Code of Best Practice only states that non-
executives be of sufficient calibre and number for their views to carry significant 
weight, that a majority of their number be independent of the company, and that they 
should be appointed for a fixed term. 
3. The efficacy of non-executive directors as a means of supervision and 
control 1 
Accordingly, it can be seen that the Cadbury Report placed great emphasis on the part 
which can be played by non-executive directors in controlling the directorial conduct 
of executive directors. It saw non-executives as the panacea to the ills of present day 
UK corporate governance. The utility of non-executive directors has long been a 
focus of attention in corporate governance debates. A Government White Paper on 
the Conduct of Company Directors stated in 1977 that: "non-executive directors ... are 
able to take a detached look at the way in which the company is being run ... They 
'*3 Ibid paragraph 4.16. 
44 /Z)/c/paragraph4.15. 
45 Ibid paragraph 4.14. 
46 See infra. 
4'^  Supra note 5, paragraph 4.5. 
48 Ibid paragraph 4.6. 
49 Ibid paragraph 4.11. 
50 ft/d/paragraph 7.2. 
51 See, inter alia: Finch, "Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance", (1992) 
Journal of Business Law 581; Picciotto, McCahery and Scott (eds). Corporate Control and 
Accountability, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994; Rowe and Maw, Corporate Governance, Dartmouth, 
1993; Finch, "Corporate Governance and Cadbury: self regulation and alternatives", (1994) Journal of 
Business Law 51; Dine, supra note 6. 
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should provide independent supervision of the company's management. "^2 The White 
Paper was followed by the establishment of the Bullock Committee which 
recommended that the board structure of large companies be constituted by an equal 
number of directors elected by shareholders and employees, balanced by an unequal 
number of independent directors greater than one, to be co-opted onto the board by the 
agreement of the shareholder and employee directors.53 The Bullock Report was 
widely criticised, mostly on the basis of the so-called "bid for union power''^ ^, and 
was relegated to the "archaeology of comparative studies in industrial democracy"55 
by the election of the present Conservative Government in 1979. 
Since the Bullock Report, there has been little clamour for changes to the composition 
of the board of directors, until the Cadbury Report. 56 As a result of the Cadbury 
Report, it is now commonplace to have non-executives on the boards of listed 
companies5'7; however, their effectiveness is much disputed. Brudney states that from 
the "panoply of structural changes being discussed" in the United States, "few have 
come with such broad support as the notion of the "outside" or "independent" 
director".58 However, this is not to say that independent/non-executive directors are 
so effective that their utility is without question. It is suggested that their presence on 
a board merely acts as a palliative to public concern without actually changing or 
improving governance structures. 
Non-executive directors are largely dependent on the board and the managing director 
for information regarding the progress and business strategy of the company. 
Establishing various extra-board committees concerning remuneration, nommations 
and audits, may help offset this lack of knowledge, although the information at the 
disposal of such committees wil l be dependent on the executive directors. The 
position of non-executive director is not full time; it is usually in addition to the 
52 Cmnd 7037, 1977, paragraphs 19-21. 
53 Supra note 3. 
54 For a refutation of such criticisms, see Wedderbum, supra note 4, at 244. 
55 Ibid 
56 See, however, the work of the organisation P R O - N E D , Promotion of Non-Executive 
Directors, which was set up in 1982 with the backing of the Stock Exchange, Confederation of British 
Industry and the Bank of England. It has been striving to promote independent, and non-executive 
directors as a normal feature of corporate boards. See Pro-ned, The Role of the Non-Executive 
Director, 1982 and 1986. 
5'7 See, inter alia: 3i, The Independent Director, 1993; P I R C Limited, The PIRC Corporate 
Governance Review: A Company Health Check, 1995. 
58 Brudney, "The Independent Du-ector - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?", (1982) 95 
Harvard Law Review 597, at 598. 
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individual's other commitments, often a full time executive directorship.59 The fact 
that non-executives are not full time reduces their motivation to enquire into company 
activities, and also confounds the lack of resources. The Cadbury Committee expects 
non-executive directors to review the conduct of the executive directors, but the extent 
and nature of this obligation is not clear. Clearly, such an obligation is not judicially 
enforceable.60 
Finch highlights the different motivating factors between executive and non-executive 
directors, an analysis of which demonstrates how little incentive there is for non-
executives to monitor management.^i The motivation of executive directors can 
clearly be traced through their dependence on the company for income, employment 
and reputation. Non-executives are usually appointed by the directors and are largely 
dependent upon them for their continued employment: the Institute of Directors points 
out that "the outsider ... can become the Chairman's confidant and mentor."62 There 
may be a "perceived need to relate constructively"63 to executive directors, or a wish 
not to be implicated in their shortcomings.64 The Government's Corporate Affairs 
Minister in 1990, John Redwood, suggested that to counteract this patronage non-
executives should be "truly independent".65 He did not, however, explain what this 
meant, or how it was to be achieved. Even were the non-executive to be motivated to 
monitor the executives, it is doubtful whether this would result in effective action 
against errant executive directors. The non-executive may not have sufficient support 
59 For analyses of the inter-locking nature of many directorships in large companies in the U K , 
see, inter alia: The Sunday Times, 14 June 1992; and. The Independent on Sunday, 4 October 1992. 
60 For a consideration of the duties of skill and care expected of a director, see Chapter Two. 
See fiirther: Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, [1925] Ch 407; in Re Produce Marketing 
Consortium (No 2), [1989] B C L C 520, at 550-551, Knox J held that the standard of skill and care 
expected of a director included, inter alia, the director being appraised of any documentary material 
available at the time of any financial difficulties, eg. the accounts, and any factual information which 
was ascertainable, given a reasonable amount of diligence and enquiry. Thus directors would have to 
ensure that they maintained their acquaintance with the affairs of the company, lest they be in breach of 
their fiduciary duties. See Bell v Lever Bros. Ltd, [1932] A C 161, for a consideration of the absence of 
an obligation on a director to report the conduct of other directors, which was distmguished in Sybron 
Corp V Rochem Ltd, [1985] C h 299, following Swain v West (Butchers) ltd, [1936] 3 Al l E R 261, 
holding that an executive director may be under a duty to disclose the misconduct of employees, even 
though doing so may disclose the director's own misconduct. 
61 Finch, "Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care", (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 
179, at 197-199. 
62 See Institute of Directors, Code of Practice for the Non-Executive Directors (undated). 
Chapter 1, reference 7. 
63 5'Mfiranote61,atl99. 
64 Such risks are now insurable. For a consideration of the issues raised, see, Finch, "Personal 
Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance", (1994) 
57 Modern Law Review 880. 
65 Quoted in Fmch, supra note 61, at 207. 
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on the board to call a general meeting to dismiss the director, or indeed may be 
reticent in canvassing such support. The same difficulties will be present in 
attempting to resolve that the board institute legal action against a negligent director, 
coupled with the fact that the company, via the board, is unlikely to want to take 
action which will court adverse publicity. 
The Cadbury Report's recommendations can usefully be analysed by a comparison 
with the role of non-executives proposed by Finch. 66 Finch suggests that non-
executives would be better able to monitor management i f they were better resourced 
and perhaps had the same right of access to company information as executive 
directors. Their influence would increase were their numbers on each board to rise, 
perhaps in line with the provisions of the draft f if th EC Company Law Directive 
which provides that there should be a majority of non-executives on the board.67 
However, Finch concludes that overall the problems of non-executives taking a 
monitoring role are "intractable" and are best seen as a "means of supplementing other 
methods ... rather than as solutions in themselves".68 Whether non-executive directors 
can restrain "unbridled corporate power" appears to be uncertain.69 
Further criticism of the emphasis placed on the non-executive as the panacea for all 
governance ills is to be found in the North American literature on the independent 
director.'^ o Solomon points out that the inquisitorial role envisaged for the non-
executive is adversarial in nature; the non-executive is supposed to investigate 
management inefficiency and abuse of power, which is "inimical to the spirit of 
cooperation which it is widely believed the board and management must maintain". 
In reality, a non-executive wil l take up a cooperative stance with the company. I f the 
board were to operate otherwise, the speed and efficiency of decision-making would 
likely be impaired, contrary to the intentions of those proposing reform. As already 
noted, non-executives are likely to be appointed by the board, perhaps approved and 
66 Ibid. It should be noted that the Cadbury Committee were reporting on the fmancial aspects 
of corporate governance and Finch is concerned with rooting out incompetence and enforcing 
directors' duties of skill and care. 
6^7 Supra note 11, article 21a. C/Finch , "Corporate Governance and Cadbury: self regulation 
and the alternatives", supra note 82, at 55, where she states that the debate on corporate governance 
would be improved were h to be "[f|reed from the "heat" of discussion of the draft fifth Directive's 
worker participation and supervisory boards" debate. 
68 5'Mpranote61,at 199. 
69 Brudney, supra note 58, at 597. 
0^ See, inter alia: Brudney, supra note 58; Solomon, "Restructuring the Corporate Board of 
Du-ectors: Fond Hope or Faint Promise?", (1978) 76 Michigan Law Review 581; and. Mace, Directors: 
Myth and Reality, Harvard University Press, 1971. 
' ' Solomon, JA/W at 589. 
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recommended by the chief executive. This of itself may engender a lack of 
motivation to "blow the whistle". The independence of the directors is put in doubt by 
the fact that, even i f not themselves executives, they "tend nevertheless to share 
common business and professional backgrounds with, and to live in the same social 
and economic milieu as does, management".''^  jn sum, "corporate boards form a 
closed club of elites sharing similar experiences and views".''^  
Brudney goes on to suggest that for non-executives to regulate self-dealing they must 
overcome the disincentives to report colleagues. The psychological and social 
pressures not to report suspicious actions mean that such actions must be "so grossly 
overreaching as not often to be proposed by management" if they are to be reported.''* 
To support this conclusion Brudney examined cases involving self-dealing or 
misappropriation of assets by management and found that the cases did not disclose 
"many" instances of outside directors challenging the offence.''^  Solomon, having 
detailed his case study of board reforms made in a spirit of improving governance, 
found that although many reforms have been implemented and are indeed 
commonplace in many large corporations, eg. audit committees and independent 
directors, the changes did "not represent genuine changes in corporate govemance".''^  
Indeed, "management had simply adopted the language and form of the restructured 
board in response to the pressure for "reform"", with few "substantive" changes being 
made.'''' Solomon's pessimistic, though perhaps accurate, conclusion is that so long as 
directors are dravra exclusively from the ranks of past and present corporate 
executives and professionals, "we are unlikely to witness major shifts in the character 
of the board".''^  More cynically, he describes the proliferation of committees to 
monitor management as a means of occupying the time of outside directors to "create 
only the illusion of board independence"'^ , and he concludes by stating that attempts 
'2 Brudney, supra note 58, at 612. 
'^ Solomon, supra note 70, at 586. Such observations apply equally to non-executives in the 
UK. Indeed, there has been considerable criticism that the staffing of remuneration committees by 
non-executive directors, who are themselves executive directors with other companies, has lead to 
increases in remuneration as non-executives seek to increase the "going-rate" to further their own self-
interest. For example, a report by the Social Market Foundation found that, contrary to the intention of 
remuneration committees, they are having the opposite effect of restraining executive pay. The 
committees are intent on ensuring that the pay for the executives of the particular company does not 
lag behind the market salary with the resuh that remuneration is "levelling up" rather than being 
restrained. See The Guardian, 18 June 1994. 
'4 5M/7ranote58, at616. 
'5 /A/^i at 617-618. 
'6 Solomon, supra note 70, at 591. 
" Ibid. 
'8 A Wat 610. 
'9 Ibid. 
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to improve corporate governance by reforming the board of directors are described as 
"anachronistic".^ " 
In placing such emphasis on the role of the non-executive director, the Cadbury 
Report implicitly recognised that shareholders do not have the monitoring role often 
assumed to them, as they do not have the ability, time or access to information to 
allow them to do so. The Cadbury Report attempted to redress this lack of 
supervision by providing for an increased role for non-executive directors. However, 
non-executive directors cannot sufficiently exercise the role arrogated to them. The 
institutional barriers to the non-executive have not been reformed; the board of 
directors and company law have largely remained the same. Inclusion of non-
executives is merely tinkering with the present system, and is not sufficiently radical 
to alter dramatically the status quo. However, this is not to say that the non-executive 
has not made any impact. Lip-service is now paid to non-executives, and their mere 
presence on the board presumably has an effect in reducing the secrecy of the board. 
However, the management of the company does not take place in the boardroom, the 
strategic decisions of the company are taken on a day to day basis by executive 
management, into which the non-executive has no insight. It is therefore suggested 
that the non-executives are a palliative: they can but help, but they cannot cure the ills. 
4. Cadbury's committees 
It has already been noted that the Cadbury Report recommended that companies 
establish a number of extra-board committees to monitor various parts of the 
management fimction. It proposed the creation of audit, remuneration, and 
nomination committees. 
4.1 Audit committees 
The Cadbury Report recommended that all listed companies establish an audit 
committee.^ 1 Its duties are to include making recommendations as to the appointment 
of the external auditor, reviewing the accounts, reviewing the audit with the external 
auditors, and reviewing the findings of any internal investigations. There should be a 
minimum of three members, and membership should be confined to non-executives, a 
majority of whom should be independent. The external auditor and the finance 
80 /6/i/at583. 
8' Supra note 5, paragraphs 4.33 - 4.38. 
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director should attend the meetings. The Report intended that the board should 
appoint an audit committee in order to delegate some of its fimctions to the 
committee. An annex to the Report sets out specimen terms of reference for an audit 
committee. Establishing an audit committee is a requirement of the Code of Best 
Practice. 
The proposals made in respect of the audit committee were watered down between the 
draft and final report. ^ 2 In the draft report, there was a requirement that audit 
committees be established within two years - this was dropped. The committee was to 
meet at least three times a year, and executive directors were only allowed to attend 
by invitation. These proposals were changed so that the committee need only meet 
twice a year, and executive directors have the right to attend. From these changes, it 
can be seen that the Cadbury Committee did consider initially that audit committees 
were to play an important role in corporate governance. Their independence was to be 
guaranteed by allowing executive directors to attend only by invitation. Moreover, a 
time limit was placed on their establishment. The final Report therefore represents a 
compromise; one which is clearly influenced by those wishing to dilute the effect of 
the Report's recommendations, and delay the implementation of corporate controls. 
4.2 Nomination committees 
The Cadbury Report states that it would be good practice (it is not a recommendation, 
nor is it in the Code of Best Practice) to establish a nomination committee. This 
committee would have "the responsibility of proposing to the board, in the first 
instance, any new appointments, whether executive or non-executive directors".^ ^ A 
nomination committee is to have a majority of non-executive directors on it. 
Thus, a nomination committee is another means of delegation of board fimction, and 
one that is intended to reduce nepotism and patronage, ensuring fairer selection 
procedures. It is suggested that it fails to do either, as the establishment of a 
nomination committee is neither a recommendation of the report, not is it in the Code 
of Best Practice. There is, therefore, no compunction on boards to appoint such a 
committee, nor is there any great emphasis placed on it. Moreover, in light of the 
comments made above regarding the ability of non-executives to be sufficiently 
robust, and their kinship with other executives and non-executives, it is unlikely that 
82 Dine, supra note 6, at 77-79. 
83 Supra note 5, paragraph 4.30. 
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the mere delegation of the proposing of corporate appointees would dramatically 
improve the present system. 
4.3 Remuneration committees 
The Cadbury Report's recommendations relating remuneration committees are closely 
tied to its recommendations on the remuneration of directors. It states that the 
overriding principle in respect of board remuneration should be that of openness.^ '* It 
recommends that when disclosing the remuneration details of the chair and highest 
paid director, separate figures are given for salary and performance related bonuses.^ ^ 
In order to assess the levels of remimeration to be paid, the Report recommends that 
boards appoint remuneration committees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-
executive directors.86 The remit of the remuneration committee is to "recommend to 
the board the remuneration of executive directors in all its forms, drawing on outside 
advice as necessary".^ ' 
The establishment and practice of remuneration committees is supported by a number 
of institutional investors committees, the Institute of Directors, and the Greenbury 
Report.*^ In May 1994, the Association of British Insurers issued guidelines on the 
Long Term Remuneration of Senior Executives which emphasised the role which 
remuneration committees must play in ensuring that performance related targets are 
set for share option schemes, and that "clear remuneration strategies for executive 
directors" are established.^ ^ j ^ g Institute of Directors published in January 1995 its 
guidelines entitled A Framework for Remuneration Committees.^'^ The guidelines set 
out matters which should be considered by remuneration committees when 
recommending remuneration packages, and the principles upon which such 
remuneration packages should be based. 
Notwithstanding such support, it was noted above that the practices of remimeration 
committees in setting directors' remuneration have been heavily criticised.^' The 
84 paragraph 4.40. 
8^  Ibid paragraph 4.40. Schedule 6 to the Companies Act provides that disclosure must be made 
in the annual report and accounts of the aggregate amount of directors' emoluments, only those of the 
chair and highest paid director must be shown separately. 
86 Ibid paragraph 4.42. 
8' Ibid. 
88 See infra. 
89 Association of British Insurers, 25 May 1994. 
90 Instittite of Directors, 25 January 1995. 
9' Supra note 73 and The Guardian, 1 May 1993. 
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controversy over the remuneration of directors has not ceased, and resulted in the 
establishment of the Greenbury Conimittee92, and the promulgation of the Accounting 
Standards Board's Urgent Issues Task Force Abstract 10 providing for greater 
disclosure of share options.93 Further, recent reports show that companies are 
disclosing far more information in their annual reports regarding the remuneration of 
directors than required to do so by the Companies Act, or by the Cadbury Report.^ -* 
This, of itself, shows that Cadbury did not go far enough; and, if it had gone fiirther, it 
would not have encountered imdue criticism from corporate boards, not could the 
argument have bee raised that such disclosure was not beneficial. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that the Cadbury Report singularly failed to recommend sufficient action in 
respect of directors' remuneration to satisfy an unconvinced public. Nonetheless, the 
Report does state that board remuneration and the disclosure thereof is something 
which will be considered by the Committee's successor.^ ^ 
4.4 The efficacy of extra-board committees 
In general, the self-regulatory reliance of the Cadbury Report was criticised, 
particularly in regard to the extra-board committees. The Institute of Internal Auditors 
criticised, particularly, the lack of statutory backing to the internal audit 
recommendation.96 The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants argued that 
the "flaw" of the report was the lack of the backing of any enforcement agency.^ ^ The 
Financial Times's Lex column stated that the Committee's faith in self-regulation was 
"touchingly naive".^ 8 
Finch has suggested that the only positive benefit of board committees is that they 
pave the way for a two-tier board, with management and supervisory organs.^ ' By 
establishing a detailed system of delegation from the board, the transition to a 
supervisory board may be more efficient and less obvious. Thus, it could be argued 
by proponents of the two-tier structure, that the board committees established by 
Cadbury may not have a particular benefit now, but that they lay the ground work for 
2^ Supra note 8. 
3^ Disclosure of Directors' Share Options, 29th September 1995. 
94 The Daily Telegraph, 16 April 1995. 
5^ Supra note 5, paragraph 4.46. The new committee has been established and a draft report is 
expected mid-1997, with the fmal report at the end of 1997. See The Times, 21 February 1996. 
96 The Guardian, 2 December 1992. 
97 Ibid. 
98 The Financial Times, 28 May 1992. 
99 Finch, "Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance", supra note 61, at 593. 
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fiiture improvements.However, it can only be presumed that it was on this basis 
that there was such concerted criticism of the draft report, leading to a watering down 
of the proposals regarding non-executive directors, and the structure and remit of the 
board committees. Moreover, it is such criticism which prevented consideration of a 
two-tier board structure, and resulted in the patchwork quilt of supervision by 
committees. The board committees, in their present form, certainly improve the 
responsiveness of boards, as they are placed under closer scrutiny. However, whether 
non-executive directors will be able to overcome their inherent reticence to actually 
involve themselves as boardroom police is a moot point, and leads to the conclusion 
that the board committees are an effective smoke-screen to real action being taken to 
improve governance. 
D. The Greenbury Report on Directors' Remuneration 
As noted above"", the Greenbury Committee was established by the Government, in 
collaboration with the CBI, in response to grave public concern over the remuneration 
levels of senior corporate executives, particularly those in the newly privatised 
utilities. The remit of the committee was to identify good practice in determining 
directors' remuneration and to draw up a Code of Practice for use by all UK pics. In 
terms of reforming the structure of the board of directors, and improving the 
governance and control of directors, the Greenbury Report merely resulted in another 
Code of Practice, following the Cadbury example, giving particular emphasis to an 
enhanced remuneration committee. 
The Code of Practice promulgated by the Greenbury Report covers four areas of 
remuneration policy: first, the formation and composition of the remuneration 
committee; secondly, increase duties of disclosure; thirdly, pension policy disclosure; 
and, fourthly, remuneration policy in general. The principal reforms made are: the 
requirement that all non-executives on the remuneration committee are independent 
(Cadbury required that only a majority were independent); all elements of the 
remuneration package of all directors to be disclosed (Cadbury and the Companies 
Act require only disclosure regarding the chairperson and the highest paid director); 
service contracts to be reduced to one year (Cadbury advocated no more than three 
'00 In much the same way as it is argued that the E C directives on the information and 
consultation of employees are not particularly effective at present, but they may enable employee 
participation in management to be more effective when such provisions are enacted. See McGlynn, 
supra note 23. 
'01 Supra notes. 
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years without shareholder approval); and, a report is to be made to AGM of the 
remuneration policy of the company. 
Thus, it can be seen that the Greenbury Report simply follows the example of 
Cadbury, strengthening Cadbury policy in a few discrete areas. The Code of Practice, 
again following the Cadbury example, is voluntary, relying on self-regulation, and is 
backed by the Stock Exchange which will require a compliance statement to be 
included in the company's accounts in order for the company to be listed.'02 it is 
suggested that in terms of improving the accountability of directors, the Greenbury 
Code of Practice is a step in the right direction. Nonetheless, it is premised on the 
same false bases as the Cadbury Report, namely a reliance on self-regulation and 
shareholder power. As will be considered in the next chapter, the ability of 
shareholders to exercise sufficient control over the board of directors is limited, and 
the very fact that the Greenbury Committee was established shows the inability of 
companies to put their own house in order. 
E . Reforming the Board of Directors as a Means of Improving 
Directorial Control 
This chapter has been concerned with an analysis of the recent reforms, and reform 
proposals, made in respect of the structure of the board of directors, in the context of 
improving directorial control. It should be emphasised that the real power in a 
company is in the hands of the executive directors who have day to day control and 
management of the company. Thus, reforming the board of directors is not going to 
alter directly the management power structure of the company. Accordingly, 
considerations as to the reform of the board of directors must recognise their 
limitations, and, it is suggested, focus on improving the supervision of the executive 
directors so that in the exercise of their management fiinction, they are accountable 
and supervised. 
The Cadbury and Greenbury Reports made a number of recommendations as to the 
structure of the board of directors, many of which have now been implemented.'03 it 
was noted, however, that the proposals made by the Reports were limited in that they 
'02 See Jeffcote and Walsh, 'Directors' Remuneration - The Greenbury Committee', (1995) 
Practical Law for Companies 43, at 44. Note that the requirement to state compliance with the Code 
of Practice does not mean that a company has to comply, merely that it has to inform its shareholders 
as to whether or not it does comply. 
"^ 3 See the PIRC Limited report, supra note 57, and Belcher, 'Compliance with the Cadbury Code 
and the Reporting of Corporate Governance', (1996) 17 Co Law 11. 
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do not substantially alter the status quo. Some of these limitations are the result of 
sustained criticism of the draft Cadbury Report published for comments. It was 
perceived that increasing the number and resources of non-executives constituted a 
threat to the unitary board, and that, accordingly, the proposals would lead to the 
creation of an actual or de facto supervisory board on the continental model. For 
example, one respondent to the draft report stated that: "The Committee's proposals 
would create a two-tier board within the legal structure if the unitary board. We do not 
regard this as tenable. "'04 in the face of this reaction, the final report sought to make 
it clear that its "proposals aim to strengthen the unitary board system and increase its 
effectiveness, not replace it".'05 Thus, for the large UK companies to whom the 
Report was addressed, the threat of "boardroom police" was expunged and it was 
business as usual. 
The Cadbury and Greenbury proposals seek their enforcement through the general 
meeting, and particulary via institutional shareholders.'06 The efficacy of relying on 
shareholders to supervise the board, and ensure accountability, will be examined in 
the next chapter. However, it is suggested here that such a sole means of reliance 
limits the reforms and will not lead to any dramatic improvement in the governance of 
directors. 
This chapter also considered proposals for a two-tier board. Notwithstanding 
opposition to such reforms, it is suggested that a two-tier board would alleviate the 
difficulties of the piece-meal nature of the committees recommended by Cadbury and 
Greenbury, and the protean nature of the responsibilities of non-executive directors. 
Such a board structure would also facilitate the involvement of parties other than 
shareholders, and non-executive directors. The representatives of employees could 
participate, allowing further views to be expressed, with different experiences. Thus, 
a two-tier board, as well as fostering improved supervision of directors, could foster 
other objectives such as securing longer-term investment by shareholders via 
institutional shareholder involvement in the supervisory board, and employee 
involvement in the company, together raising standards of corporate citizenship. 
'04 See Dine, supra note 6, at 75. See also. Company Law Committee of the Law Society 
Response to the Draft Report, 1992; Sir O Green, "Why Cadbury Leaves a Bitter Taste", Financial 
Times, 9 June 1992. The new chair of the Cadbury Committee's successor committee has stated that he 
does not consider the model of the two-tier board to be appropriate in the UK. See The Times, 21 
February 1996. 
'05 Supra note 5, paragraph 1.8. 
'06 See further Chapter Four. 
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However, it is recognised that to impose such a structure onto all companies may be 
more detrimental than advantageous. The Labour Party has proposed that legislation 
is enacted to provide a statutory basis for a two-tier board structure for those larger 
companies wishing to adopt it"'^, akin to the present format of the draft fifth EC 
Company Law Directive. In respect of two-tier and unitary boards, there would be 
minimums standards for the composition of the board.'"8 Such proposals are 
welcomed. Moreover, it is suggested that whether a company chooses to adopt a two-
tier board structure should be open to a certain percentage of the shareholders, and/or 
a number of the employees, to mandate.'"9 
"'^  The Labour Party, Winning for Britain - Labour's strategy for industrial success, 1994. 
108 Ibid. 
'09 It is suggested that this figure is substantially lower than 50%, so that the threshold is reached 
by a relatively small number of investors acting together. Otherwise, the option would remain in the 
hands of the board in whose interests it is to limit supervision. 
68 
C H A P T E R F O U R 
S H A R E H O L D E R D E M O C R A C Y I N T H E 
S H A R E H O L D E R S ' C I T Y S T A T E 
A . Introduction 
Chapters One, Two and Three considered a variety of means of controlling the 
conduct of directors. A number of the controls examined relied on shareholder 
participation aiid action to make them effective. This chapter will focus on the ability 
of shareholders to participate and take appropriate action to control the activities of 
directors. 
In the early nineteenth century, when companies were first incorporating, it was usual 
that shareholders were involved in the management of the enterprise.' That this was 
necessarily so was largely due to the lack of any market for 'shares' in the company, 
and a strong emphasis between ownership and responsibility.^ However, as the size 
of companies grew, it was increasingly inappropriate for the members of the company 
to participate in day to day management. Thus, management began to be delegated to 
directors, and the interests of the shareholders were protected by statutory controls and 
fiduciary principles. It is this conception of the company which is described as the 
shareholders' 'city state' - the 'fundamental model of British Company law'.^  The 
analogy with the processes of representative democratic government has immediate 
resonance. The shareholders of the company elect their representatives to the board of 
directors, who manage the company on their behalf, and are accountable to them. It is 
in this context that the regulation of corporate activity must be considered: generally, 
such regulation is aimed at increasing the power of shareholders to control their 
1 See, inter alia: Schmitthoff, "The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company", (1939) University of 
Toronto Law Journal 74; Hahlo, "Early Progenitors of the Modem Company", (1982) Juridical Review 
139; Campbell, "Adam Smith, Farrar on Company Law and the Economics of the Corporation", (1990) 
Anglo-American Law Review 185; Santuari, "The Joint Stock Company in Nineteenth Century England 
and France: King v Dodd and the Code de Commerce", (1993) 14 Legal History 39; Butler, "General 
Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes", 
(1986) International Review of Law and Economics 169; Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 
Butterworths, 5th ed, 1992, at 19-54 and the citations therein. 
2 See, Grigg-Spall, Ireland & Kelly, "The Conceptual Foundations of Modem Company Law", 
in Fitzpatt-ick and Hunt (eds), Critical Legal Studies, Basil Blackwell, 1987; Wedderbum, 'Companies 
and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension', (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 220. 
3 See generally Wedderbum, "The Legal Development of Corporate Social Responsibility: For 
Whom will Corporate Managers be Trustees?", in Hopt and Teubner (eds). Corporate Governance and 
Directors Liabilities, Walter de Grutyer, 1985. 
assets, the stewardship of which has been put in the hands of the directors. Regulation 
of corporate activity and directorial conduct did not arise from a wish to direct and 
control the activities of large scale enterprises for the greater social and economic 
good, but had the proprietary interests of shareholders at heart. This principle of 
'shareholder democracy' continues to be a fundamental principle of company law, of 
great influence and symbolic significance. 
Nonetheless, from around the time of Berle & Means"* classic study showing the 
inability of shareholders to control the management of a large corporation where there 
is a clear separation of ownership and control, the utility of shareholder control of 
corporate activity and directorial conduct has been brought into question. This 
chapter will consider whether such criticisms are justified. 
B. The Relationship between the Board of Directors and the 
Shareholders 
The traditional relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders is that 
the board exercises control over the day to day management of the company, 
delegated to executive directors, while the shareholders remain the final arbiters of 
constitutional changes, and have ultimate power to remove the board from office. The 
standard formulation of the relationship between the board and shareholders can be 
found in the statutory articles of association. Table A. Article 70 of Table A states 
that "subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company". Thus, unless the 
articles, or the Companies Acts, specifically provide otherwise, shareholders can only 
intervene in the management of the company by passing a special resolution in 
general meeting.^  
4 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Commerce 
Clearing House, 1932. 
5 The power of the shareholders to mandate the board to act in a particular manner by means of 
passing a special resolution was inserted into Table A by the Companies Act 1985. The analogous 
article under the 1948 Companies Act Table A, Article 80, which still forms part of the articles of a 
large number of companies, provided only that shareholders could direct the conduct of directors "as 
may be prescribed by the company in general meetmg". This caused much controversy as to whether 
or not shareholders could control the conduct of directors by means of an ordinary or special 
resolution. The words, on their face, would seen to indicate that an ordinary resolution was all that was 
required, but there was confusion in the case law. In Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v 
Cunninghame, [1906] 2 Ch 34, the Court of Appeal held that where the articles of the company stated 
that the power of management was vested m the directors, the members, in general meeting, could not 
take management decisions. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Quin & Axtens v Salmon, 
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In reality, in the large public company, shareholders are unlikely to command a 75% 
majority to pass the required special resolution, particularly where there is opposition 
from the board of directors. Further, shareholders do not have knowledge of the day 
to day management of the company, and it is therefore unrealistic to expect them to be 
aware of the potential need for preventative action.^  Moreover, the management 
function is ordinarily delegated by the board to a nimiber of executive directors; thus, 
the shareholders are even further removed from the decision making processes. 
Accordingly, in practice, shareholders do not have power to directly regulate the 
management of the company by the board. Although it would appear that 
shareholders are able to control management by means of passing a special resolution, 
the dynamics of corporate practice prove this exercise of shareholder control and 
democracy to be largely illusory. 
C. The Shareholders' Power to Remove Directors from Office 
The primary power of the shareholders is the right to remove directors from office by 
means of an ordinary resolution.'^  It is this power which is relied on as the means by 
which shareholders can control the conduct of directors: the threat of removal is 
supposedly ever present. Thus, the Cadbury Report states that "the shareholders as 
owners of the company elect the directors to run the business on their behalf and hold 
them accountable for its progress".^  Accordingly, "[i]t is for the shareholders to call 
the directors to book if they appear to be failing in their stewardship and they should 
use [the section 303] power".^  The accountability of boards to shareholders will be 
"strengthened", the Cadbury Report argued, if shareholders require their companies to 
comply with the Code of Best Practice. In addition, the guidelines issued by the 
Institute of Directors concerning the remuneration of directors endorse this view of 
shareholder control, stating that if shareholders are not content with the remuneration 
[1909] AC 442. However, the position may still be far from clear, and will continue to be relevant 
where companies still have articles in the form provided by the Companies Act 1948. See Gower, 
supra note 2, at 150-152. For the opposing view see: Marshall's Valve Gear Co v Manning Wardle & 
Co, [1909] 1 Ch 267; Sullivan, "The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the General 
Meeting in Limited Companies", (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review, 569; Goldberg, 'Article 80 of Table 
A of the Companies Act 1948', (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 177. 
6 Action would need to be taken in advance as, once committed to a contract, a third party is 
protected, see section 35 of the Companies Act. 
7 Section 303 of the Companies Act. 
8 Cadbury Committee, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, paragraph 6.1. 
9 Ibid paragraph 6.6. 
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of the directors, or of their management of the company, then they should take action 
to remove them from the board.'o 
Thus, the governance of the company is in the hands of shareholders, and it is their 
duty to see that directors are taking all steps necessary to manage the company 
effectively. However, in a large public company, the ability of shareholders to secure 
a majority of 50% for the passing of an ordinary resolution removing a director is 
remote. A shareholder would have to bear the entire cost of publicity in attempting to 
persuade other shareholders to support the resolution. Moreover, the command of the 
board of the proxy machinery is renowned. Thus, it is suggested that the ability of 
shareholders to take action to remove directors, though theoretically possible, is 
deceptive. 
More significant than the inability of shareholders to remove directors, due to a lack 
of resources and the requirement of an ordinary resolution, is the financial premium 
on such removal. Section 319 of the Companies Act provides that shareholder 
approval must be given to the service contract of a director which exceeds five years 
Criticism of the five year period led the Cadbury Report to suggest that the period be 
reduced to three years." As a result of the Cadbury Report and continuing public 
concern, the length of directors' service contracts has been slowly decreasing.'2 
However, although three year rolling contracts may be in the minority'3, even a two or 
one year rolling contract still places a substantial financial premium on the removal of 
a director from office. 
In smaller companies, often termed quasi-partnerships, action can be taken to entrench 
a director in office. Thus, in Bushell v Faith a director was given weighted voting 
rights so that he could not be removed from office.''* In Harman v BML Group pic it 
was held that the right of a director to remain in office could take the form of a class 
right, thus preventing his removal.'^  In such circumstances, the provisions of section 
10 Institute of Directors, The Remuneration of Directors - A Framework for Remuneration 
Committees, 25 January 1995, at 2. 
11 Supra note 8, paragraph 4.41. 
12 See, for example: The Times, 23 February 1995; The Guardian, 18 February 1995; The 
Guardian, 25 January 1995; The Financial Times, 8 November 1994. 
13 In The Financial Times, 8 November 1994, the resuhs of a study were published showing that 
39% of directors were still on three year rolling contracts. 
14 [1970] 2 WLR 272. See fiirther, McGlynn, 'The Constitution of the Company: Mandatory 
Statutory Provisions v Private Agreements', (1994) 15 Co Law 301. 
15 [1994] 1 WLR 893. See fiirther, McGlynn, 'Re-Writing the Corporate Constitution', (1995) 
Journal of Business Law, 585. 
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303 of the Companies Act are effectively evaded and the position of directors 
entrenched. In addition to such preventative measures, it may also be possible to 
allege, under section 459 of the Companies Act, that the removal of a director from 
office amounts to imfairly prejudicial conduct.'^  
Thus, it can be seen that in both the large public company, and the small quasi-
partnership, there are substantial limitations on the power of shareholders to take 
action to remove directors from office. It is suggested that the focus which has been 
placed on the power of shareholders to remove directors from office is misplaced, as 
in practice this power only acts as a threat, and not a particularly effective one in light 
of the limited chances of success. 
D. Institutional Shareholders 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, the ability of shareholders to take action to control the conduct of directors 
has focused on the individual shareholder who, in a large public company with diverse 
ownership, is one of many thousands, and therefore largely powerless. As a result of 
such a weak position, it was suggested that the ability of shareholders to take action, 
whether it is action against a director for breach of fiduciary duty or action to remove 
a director from office, is limited. Shareholders of large public companies have a far 
simpler, and potentially economically rational, means of showing their concern with 
management - selling their shares. Partly in response to a recognition of the futility of 
individual shareholder control, it was found in Chapter Three that the Cadbury Report 
placed great emphasis on the ability of non-executive directors to become boardroom 
police, exercising control where shareholders had failed.'"' In addition, however, the 
Cadbury Report focused on the part played by institutional shareholders. This section 
will consider the ability of institutional shareholders to exercise control over 
directorial conduct. 
The institutional shareholder is the large pension fund owner, insurance company, 
manager of unit and investment trusts. Institutional shareholders are, in effect, 
holding shares on behalf of individuals and it has therefore been suggested that there 
is an "important degree of common interest"'^  between the individual and the 
16 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd, [1984] Ch 419. 
17 Supra note 8 and Chapter Three. 
18 5i(pra note 8, paragraph 6.9. 
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institution. The dominance of institutional shareholders is a "well-established fact".'9 
In 1963 institutions owned 22.1% of the ordinary shares of listed UK companies; in 
1990 the figure was 61.3%.2o Clearly, therefore, institutional shareholders have the 
potential to exercise substantial control over the companies in which they invest. It is 
the willingness and ability of institutions to exert control which is much disputed. 
2. Investor Protection Committees 
The institutions have become increasingly vocal in recent years, and regularly issue 
recommendations or guidelines relating to the management of corporate affairs 
through via the Investor Protection Committees . The Investor Protection Committees 
(IPCs) is a collective term for the Investment Committees of the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds Limited 
(NAPF). The aim of the IPCs is to provide institutional shareholders with a set of 
guidelines and recommendations to enable them to exercise their collective voting 
power in a maimer the IPCs consider necessary to enhance the value of institutional 
shareholdings. This collective voice is concerned not only with matters of corporate 
profit-making, but also, increasingly, with issues of corporate governance. The IPCs 
have issued extensive guidelines and recommendations on a variety of subjects, 
including: the role and duties of directors2i; the responsibilities of institutional 
shareholders22; long term remuneration for senior executives23; service contracts2'*; 
and, good investor relations.25 
Broadly, the guidelines and recommendations of the IPCs follow the path already 
tread by Cadbury. They urge more openness, increased information to shareholders, 
compliance with the Cadbury Code of Best Practice, increasing numbers of non-
executive directors, and the establishment of numerous extra-board committees. The 
19 See fiirther, Davies, "Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom", in Prentice and Holland 
(eds). Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1993, at 70. 
20 Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends, October 1991, at 153. In recent years the 
incidence of individual shareholding has increased, see the Central Statistical Office's publication 
"Economic Trends No. 480", HMSO, 1994, which found that the long period of decline in individual 
ownership of shares has stopped as individual shareholding increased to an estimated 20% of the UK 
market. 
21 ABI, 12 June 1990; IPC, 18 April 1991. 
22 IPC, December 1991. 
23 ABI, 25 May 1994. 
24 NAPF, The Times, 18 November 1994. 
25 NAPF. The other guidelines and recommendations issued are: the dis-application of statutory 
pre-emption rights and directors' authority to allot securities; vendor placings; purchase of own shares; 
scrip dividends; management buy-outs; share schemes; research and development expenditure; 
investment trust company guidelines; good investor relations; and mortgage debenture stock. 
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IPCs support the unitary board, and endorse the right of management to manage free 
from intervention. 
The IPCs consider their obligations to be that, as the proprietors of companies, 
institutional investors are imder a strong obligation to exercise their influence in a 
responsible manner.26 Such obligations are to be met by means of, inter alia: strong 
communication with the boards of the companies in which the institutional 
shareholders invest; support of boards should be given by the positive exercise of 
voting rights; votes should be registered on a regular basis; the composition of the 
board should be monitored and action taken where there are deficiencies; and, 
opposition to the issue of non-voting shares. 
Accordingly, it can be seen that the IPCs ensure that institutional shareholders, 
although individually important and having a significant voice, are collectively very 
effective in mobilising compliance with their particular concept of good governance 
and management. However, the caveat remains that institutional shareholders have a 
particular constituency to protect, the value of their shareholdings, and a limited 
agenda that has the maximisation of investment returns at the top. 
3. The Cadbury Report 
The agenda of the institutional shareholders is closely matched by that of the Cadbury 
Report which placed great importance on the role of institutional shareholders in its 
corporate governance vision. The Report stated that: "[gjiven the weight of their 
votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence 
standards of corporate governance is of fundamental importance".^ '^  In particular, the 
Cadbury Report endorsed the statement of the IPCs on the responsibilities of 
institutional shareholders, considered above, with specific emphasis on: regular and 
systematic contact with senior executives of the companies in which the institutional 
shareholder has invested; positive use of voting rights and registration of votes on a 
regular basis; institutional investors taking a positive interest in the composition of 
boards.28 The Cadbury Report recommends further that institutional shareholders 
disclose their policies on the use of voting rights. 
26 Supra note 8, at 1. 
27 Ibid paragraph 6.10. 
28 Ibid paragraph 6.11. 
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Owing to the "collective stake"^^ of the institutions, the Cadbury Report seeks to rely 
on the institutional shareholders to use their influence to ensure that the Report's 
recommendations are implemented. The Cadbury Committee was essentially looking 
to such "market-based regulation to turn its proposals into action".^^ This leads to a 
clear paradox. The Cadbury Committee was established as a result of concern 
regarding standards of corporate governance. Hitherto, shareholders had been the 
focus of the control of directors, and, as this was obviously failing, the Cadbury 
Committee was established. Therefore, where shareholders had in the past failed to 
monitor companies and reform board practices, the Cadbury Committee now hoped 
that they would be able to do so by the mere existence of their Report. The weight on 
the shoulders of the institutions is great: they are to be expected effectively to replace 
the effort by individual shareholders in monitoring the effectiveness of the directors, 
and are to ensure no less than the implementation of the Cadbury Report itself 
However, it has been argued that the recommendations may "excessively" 
institutionalise an already "de facto lack of parity "31 between the institutional and 
individual shareholders, leaving the individuals less empowered than ever before. The 
Cadbury Report envisages that the institutional shareholders will represent the 
individuals as there is a common interest between them. However, there will not 
always be such common accord. An institution which depends on both long term 
profits and interim high resuhs, may have a different agenda from the individual who 
wishes to invest in the long term aims of the company and/or wishes to have an easily 
resaleable commodity. There may be a real conflict of interest between the institution 
and the individual, the institution seeks to pursue its own aims and returns, which may 
be quite different from those of the individual investor.32 Further, it could be argued 
that, seeking to control the unbridled exercise of power by large companies, by 
diluting the control of individual shareholders and improving the position of the 
institutions, is merely passing power from one large institution to another, thus raising 
a whole set of new questions regarding accountability and governance. 
In the end, it may be that the Cadbury Committee's clear intention to improve 
corporate governance within the framework of current company law and practice, is 
29 Ibid paragraph 6.16. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Finch, 'Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance', (1992) Journal of 
Business iaw 5 81, at 587. 
32 For example, an institution may be able to ride out a financially risky course of conduct, 
taking the risk of failure. An individual shareholder may not wish to follow this course of action as 
their shareholding represents their lunited savings and investments. 
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its principal failure. It is this very practice and law which was the original root of 
criticism. The paradox is that the Committee sought to reform the control of 
shareholders in the 'city state', as it recognised the inherent limitations of this 
approach. However, its reform proposals place great store on institutional shareholder 
control. Where the Cadbury Committee failed was that although it recognised the 
limitations of individual shareholder control, it omitted to suggest a departure from 
such control, other than emphasising an increased role for institutional shareholders. 
It is suggested that only i f traditional concepts and modes of practice are reformed 
wil l debate be open to new and alternative reform proposals. In this context, it is 
disappointing to note that the Cadbury Committee's recommendations were criticised 
as being too wide-ranging and radical, particularly where it was considered that the 
recommendations in the Report were a means of introducing a two-tier board by the 
back door. However, this does not of itself suggest that their recommendations were 
too broad and radical. Rather, it confirms that those involved in the Cadbury 
Committee, and those who responded thereto, are those with vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo. 
4. The Greenbury Report 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Greenbury Committee was established in 1995 as 
a result of continuing public concern regarding the remuneration of directors. The 
resuhant Report^s promulgated a Code of Practice akin to that of the Cadbury Report, 
setting out guidelines for companies and in particular remuneration committees. The 
Code of Best Practice is to be enforced in the same marmer as the Cadbury Code, 
namely by means of the Stock Exchange Listing Requirements.^^ Thus, the 
Greenbury Report follows the Cadbury example of self-regulation and governance by 
encouraging fiiU disclosure of corporate information. Reliance on full disclosure 
implies that someone has to read the information disclosed and act upon it i f 
necessary. The Greenbury Report envisages that such surveillance is to be carried out 
by institutional shareholders. It states that the 'investor institutions should use their 
power and influence to ensure the implementation of best practice as set out in the 
Code'.35 
The Greenbury Committee recognised, as the Cadbury Committee before it had done 
33 Greenbury Committee, Directors' Remuneration - Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury, 1995. 
34 Ibid paragraph 3.3. 
35 ft/<iparagraph 3.4. 
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so, the futility of individual shareholder activism, and instead placed emphasis on 
institutional shareholders to ensure compliance with their Code. However, the 
institutions are not given new powers by the Greenbury Report, nor by any 
recommendations for statutory reform in the Report. Accordingly, the same 
institutional shareholders which are now to be vigilant over the remuneration of 
directors, to see that it does not conflict with the Greenbury Code, are the self same 
institutions which took no action when directors were being remunerated at levels 
which caused the pressure for the establishment of the Greenbury Committee. It 
therefore remains to be seen whether any improvement in standards and accountability 
of directors' remuneration will result.36 
5. An analysis of institutional activism 
The Cadbury Committee espoused the view that the increasing activism of the 
institutional shareholders was beneficial, and the Report sought to encourage such 
participation. However, there is a body of opinion which views the activism of 
institutional shareholders with more than scepticism. The proposition advanced is 
that a greater degree of managerial discretion is preferable to increasing shareholder 
involvement, as shareholder participation leads inevitably to short-termism.37 Short-
termism has been described as the "fundamental deficiency of the UK economy; a 
systematic failure to commit"38 to ownership in the long term. Essentially, it is argued 
that "enhancing shareholder pressure causes corporate management to take decisions 
that increase the company's revenues in the short term, but at the expense of its long-
term profitability and competitiveness".3^ This is an argument which is often levelled 
at the UK's emphasis on the value of shares and on the controlling of investment by 
institutions. It is asserted that the prices of shares are "inadequate conveyors of 
information"'*'', and that the way to improve the governance of companies is not by 
increasing the interests of the shareholders, but by ensuring that a company acts in the 
interests of other constituencies, most often named as employees, consumers, 
creditors, and society in general. Only i f this is the case, it is contended, will the 
company act in its long term interests. Whatever the veracity of this argument, it must 
be considered whether institutions, whether acting in the short or long term, are 
36 Ibid paragraph 3.11. The effectiveness of the Greenbury Report is to be examined by the 
Cadbury Committee's successor which is due to produce an interim report mid-1997, followed by a 
final report at the end of 1997. See The Times, 21 February 1996. 
37 See further Davies, supra note 19, at 78-81. 
38 See The Guardian, 22 February 1993. 
39 See, Davies, supra note 19, at 79. 
40 See The Guardian, supra note 38. 
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efficient controllers of directorial conduct. 
Many institutions do not wish to take on the mantel of shareholder monitoring, they 
are "rationally apathetic".To such institutions, the costs of monitoring and voting 
exceed the benefit of their investment. This is recognised by NAPF who have 
established a "voting issues service" which considers annual general meeting notices, 
and reports on matters which may be of concern to institutions. The tradition of UK 
institutions is to limit the extent of involvement in any one company to approximately 
1-2%. This "reflects the preference of British institutions for liquidity over control".''^ 
There are exceptions. M «fe G have a policy of securing a significant holding, 2.5-5%, 
in a company in order to influence management.'*^ However, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries did not exactly 
encourage institutional investor monitoring.'''* During the case, which involved 
complex and detailed questions of the scope of the derivative action, the Court of 
Appeal were invited to give judicial approval to the public spirit of the plaintiffs, who, 
it was said, were pioneering control of companies in the public interest without 
involving regulation by a statutory body. The Court of Appeal responded by stating 
that, in its view, the voluntary regulation of companies is a matter for the City, and 
declined to make any general observations. 
Even in the light of evidence that historically UK institutions do not become involved 
in corporate management, there are examples of areas where the institutions have 
succeeded in achieving changes in corporate practice. Postel, one of the largest fiind 
managers, announced in 1994 that it would be utilising its vote to vote against the re-
election of any director who has a service contract longer than two years.''^  This has 
had a significant effect on the service contracts of directors. In addition, the 
institutions have long run a campaign against non-voting shares.'*^  Weinberg notes 
that "a nimiber of proposals to make capitalisation issues to ordinary shareholders in 
non-voting shares have been dropped following institutional objections" and that 
"there are no instances in recent years of a company seeking a listing for any class of 
41 See Coffee, "Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitors: Are takeovers Obsolete?", in 
Farrar (ed), Takeovers. Institutional Investors and the Modernisation of Corporate Laws, Oxford 
University Press, 1993, at 15. 
42 Ibid at 50. 
43 Ibid. 
44 [1980]3 WLR543. 
45 The Guardian, 25 June 1994. See also the statement by Ifina of their intention to vote against 
directors' "long-term" service contracts, Financial Times, 6 June 1993. 
46 Ironically though very few institutions exercise their votes. See Coffee, supra note 41, at 50. 
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non-voting equity capital".''^ Also, pressure from institutional shareholders, and the 
second EC Company Law Directive, led to statutory reform in respect of shareholder 
pre-emption rights, and institutions frequently gain greater rights than statutorily 
demanded.''^  
In addition, it is argued that the part the institutional shareholder can play in the 
monitoring of management is much wider than the context of individual companies. 
Coffee argues that the institutional shareholder can replace the need for the takeover 
as the means of regulation of company management. This thesis is based on an 
analysis of the costs to institutional shareholders of monitoring, and effectively acting 
prior to management incompetence, and the costs of the market for corporate confrol. 
Coffee asserts that the costs of institutional monitoring are less than the market for 
corporate control, arguing that "institutional pressure on corporate managers could 
conceivably work as well as takeover bids - but involve less disruption, waste and 
undesired side effects".'^ ^ 
Although institutional shareholders are being active in the regulation of companies, it 
is not likely that they wil l seek to exercise more power than they already have. 
Institutions have to strike a balance between losing the liquidity of their shareholding, 
and the benefits of participation in corporate control. Moreover, it is not likely that 
mere exhortation wil l encourage the institutions to be more interventionist. Indeed, it 
is argued that "it is not difficult to see that intervention itself might bring its own 
rather different political risks with it, involving a question of the legitimacy of the 
power sought to be exercised by the institutions".The problem of regulating the 
regulators was not considered by the Cadbury Committee, but Coffee notes that this 
may become as issue with the increased role of institutions. He recognises that in 
many cases the "institutional investors are less accountable to their "owners" than are 
corporate managements to their shareholders".Finch notes the increased 
involvement of institutions in the management of companies, but doubts their long 
term commitment by questioning whether, "such interventionism will evaporate as the 
47 Weinberg, Weinberg and Blank on Take-Overs and Mergers, London, 1989, paragraphs 3-
805. Note, however, the view of the proponents of the markets as a means of control, who consider 
that the issue of non-voting shares would make little difference to the activities of the company: 
"shareholders interests are not protected by voting but by the market for stock, the market for goods 
and the market for managers services". See, Easterbrook and Fischel, (1993) XXVI(2) Journal of Law 
and Economics, Symposium on Corporations and Private Property, at 397. 
48 Companies Act 1985 sections 89-95. See also Davies, supra note 19, at 85-87. 
49 See, Coffee, supra note 41, at 13. 
50 See, Davies, supra note 19, at 90. 
51 See, Coffee, supra note 41, at 19. 
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recession ends and investors find it easier once more to vote v^th their feet rather than 
fight for improved management".52 
E . Conclusions: The Utility of Shareholder Democracy 
This chapter has been concerned with the fact that, as owners of the company, 
shareholders have traditionally been the primary focus of directorial control. It was 
considered that, in reality, the relationship between the board of directors and 
shareholders does not afford great shareholder power to control the conduct of 
directors, nor does the power to remove a director from office a significant weapon in 
the shareholders' armoury. Accordingly, the position of institutional shareholders was 
analysed, and it was noted that recent innovations in corporate governance, namely 
the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports, place considerable emphasis on the ability of 
institutional shareholders to exercise control over directors in a manner which eludes 
individuals. 
This focus on shareholder control of directorial conduct has been heavily criticised. 
Wedderbum argues that this is the "shareholders' democracy of the nineteenth century 
joint stock company", and that directorial control should have moved with the times.53 
As long ago as 1945, the Cohen Committee noted the "illusory nature of the control 
theoretically exercised by shareholders over directors".5'* The Jenkins Committee of 
1962 opined that shareholder democracy was "theoretically desirable", but its severe 
limitations were recognised.55 Indeed, it has now become common place to deride the 
idea of shareholder democracy. Sealy argues that it is "an easy catchword"^^, leading 
the legislature to be "mesmerised by the congenial but false analogy with 
parliamentary democracy; their assumptions belong only to dream-world".57 This 
analogy, Sealy argues, is false in that the majority of small companies do not hold 
meetings; larger companies do hold meetings but they are unrepresentative because of 
the management's control of the proxy votes; the initiative is with management; 
shareholders are generally apathetic; and, institutional shareholders mainly proceed on 
52 Finch, "Corporate Governance and Cadbury: self regulation and the alternatives", (1994) 
Journal of Business Law 51, at 58. Note, however, the fact that there are a number of institutions where 
their shareholding is so great that "exit" is not such a viable choice. 
53 Swpranote 3, at 6. 
54 DTI, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmnd 6659, 1945, paragraph 
7(e). 
55 Cmnd 1749, paragraph 14. 
56 Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, at 29 and 61. 
57 Ibidal6\. 
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the basis of letting things be.^ ^ Sealy concludes that "any idea that shareholder 
democracy can be made to work as a counter to managerial powers is baseless, and 
has been shown to be false by every fieldwork study that has been undertaken, from 
those of Berle and Means in the 1930s to the present day."^^ 
Hopt argues that European moves away from shareholder democracy as a method of 
taming corporate power result from an apparent "dissolution" with the effectiveness of 
shareholder democracy.*^ Hopt continues that this is "hardly surprising" because, 
apart from the problems inherent in a large and varied ownership attempting to confrol 
powerfial management, "the cost-benefit balance for small shareholders of investing 
more effort in participation and control is clearly negative".The Bullock Report on 
Industrial Democracy argued from a different direction, namely that "to regard the 
company as solely the property of shareholders is to be out of touch with the complex 
reality of the present day company as a complex social and economic entity, in which 
the powers of control have passed from the legal owners to the professional 
management".62 Wedderbum "reveals" by his analysis of the case law surrounding 
the doctrine of ultra vires, "the tensions of courts caught in a web of legal rules based 
upon "shareholders' democracy" against which the social facts rebel".^^ Moreover, he 
argues that the analogy of the 'city state' cloaks the relationship between the 
shareholders and the directors with unwarranted legitimacy.^ 
Easterbrook & Fischel, advocates of the markets as means of control, decry the 
significance attached to shareholder control: "corporations are not participatory 
democracies "governing" the shareholders but are business entities affected by the 
market for their products".Thus, opponents of shareholder democracy and control 
come not only from those concerned to regulate the company in the interests of wider 
constituencies (e.g. Wedderbum's emphasis on companies being more socially 
responsible), but from market theorists who decry all intervention in company 
management. 
58 See, Sealy, supra note 56, and Finch, "Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and 
Care?", (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 179. 
59 Sealy, supra note 56, at 61. 
60 Hopt, 'New Ways of Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor 
Representation on Corporate Boards', (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1138, at 1340. 
61 Ibid. 
62 DTI, Report of the Committee ofInquiry on Industrial Democracy, Cmnd 6706, 1977, Chapter 
6, paragraph 2. 
63 Si/pranote 3, at23. 
64 Infra. 
65 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 47, at 396. 
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Yet the law reformers, despite the "illusion", continue to advocate increased powers 
for the general meeting and the shareholders' generally; the "reformers and would-be 
reformers will not give up their nostalgic striving after a wholly unattainable ideal".66 
This is not to say that shareholders are not able to exert and influence over 
management: shareholders can affect the management of a company, but this is not 
the continuous and effective control by owners, as is supposed in the true 
shareholders' city state. This view is not necessarily out of step with the criticisms 
referred to above. The ideal of shareholder democracy suggests that shareholders 
ought to be able to control their property, and that the company should act in their 
interests. The failure of this ideal in practice is not necessarily at odds with a 
recognition that shareholders can be influential; it merely recognises that shareholder 
control carmot be the sole means of control i f there is to be effective regulation of 
directorial conduct. 
The pursuit of the "unobtainable ideal" does continue. Thus, the Cadbury Committee 
saw its objective in terms of enhancing management accountability to the owners of 
the company, the shareholders.^ ^ In other words, it exactly espoused the classical 
orthodoxy criticised above to be so outdated and ineffective. Criticism of the Cadbury 
Report has come from all sides^s, although the Government's Corporate Affairs 
Minister, Neil Hamilton, stated that the report was an "authoritative statement of what 
needed to be done in a crucial area".^ ^ Moreover, the Confederation of British 
Industry stated that the increased responsibility on investors, particularly the 
institutional investors, set the "right sort of framework" for increasing directorial 
control.''0 A leader comment in one national newspaper''', criticised the Cadbury 
Report in that it did "little to re-engage the cogs of ownership with the engine of 
management from which it has been cut adrift". Thus, the Cadbury report was 
criticised on the basis that it did not improve the power of shareholders, the owners. 
Shareholder power is still considered a panacea for all regulatory ills. 
However, it has been shovm that the ability of shareholders to exert the required 
influence over their property is limited. That shareholders, particularly institutional 
66 Wedderbum, supra note 3, at 23. 
67 Supra note 8, paragraph 6.16. 
68 See Chapter Three. 
69 Reported in The Guardian, 2 December 1992. The opposition spokesperson on Corporate 
Affairs dubbed the voluntary Code a "recipe for mactivity", quoted in Finch, supra note 31, at 584. 
70 The Guardian, 2 December 1992. 
71 Ibid. 
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shareholders, can, to a certain extent, control the conduct of directors is accepted. It is 
the tacit approval of shareholder control as a substitute for all controls, and as the cure 
for all ills, which is refiited on a number of bases. First, shareholders do not have the 
zeal to concentrate on controlling the conduct of directors: it is more cost effective to 
sell their shares. Secondly, those shareholders who are interested in participating in 
the regulation of corporate activity may do so, pursuing their own agenda, which is 
contrary to the general interests of the company, or stakeholders other than 
shareholders. Thirdly, shareholders who do have the interests of the company at 
heart, and wish to take action to control the conduct of directors, lack the resources, 
knowledge^and incentive, and face substantial legal obstacles, to taking such action. 
Finally, the focus on shareholders alone refrises to acknowledge the other competing 
interests in corporate and directorial activity. Creditors have an interest in the 
company not becoming insolvent; shareholders may wish to write off the losses so 
that further are not incurred. Employees have an interest in maintaining employment 
levels, together with appropriate terms and conditions of employment; it is in the 
interests of shareholders wishing to achieve higher returns, to reduce staffing and pay. 
Consumers may be adversely affected by the sale of a product which has not been 
adequately tested; shareholders may benefit from immediate sales, even taking into 
account costs of future legal action. Society may wish rivers not to be polluted; 
shareholders wishing to achieve maximum profits may find it more cost-effective not 
to treat waste appropriately. The thesis is not that all the competing interests should 
have a say in management and control; the argument is that sheer reliance on 
shareholder self-interest is neither effective nor appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the means by which the conduct of directors is controlled. 
Chapter One considered the operation of the markets for corporate control, products, 
and managerial talent. It was found that the markets exercised a discipline over 
corporate managers, but that such discipline may have adverse affects on third parties 
in terms of: first, the compliance costs associated with effecting the changes mandated 
by the markets; secondly, the impact of the markets on employees, consumers and 
creditors; and, thirdly, the adverse impact which focus on a company's share price 
may have on investment and management generally. Moreover, it was found that 
markets are not free, but are heavily regulated in order to facilitate one view of the 
operation of markets; namely, regulation in order to "free" the markets. In this light, it 
was concluded that consideration should appropriately be given to alternative means 
of regulating directorial conduct and markets. 
Chapter Two examined the fiduciary duties of directors. It was found that the control 
mechanisms studied were either dependent on shareholder or governmental action. 
As a result of lack of funds, and lack of purpose, governmental control is negligible in 
comparison to the daily management of corporate activity in the UK. Governmental 
control tends to be focused on a small number of extreme cases where retributive 
action is taken in the interests of the public.' Control by shareholders is limited 
because of their lack of knowledge, resources, experience, and apathy. Thus, the part 
played by directors' fiduciary duties, and other specific controls and prohibitions, is 
important, but should not be relied on to control effectively directorial conduct. 
Chapter Three considered the effect of the structure of the board of directors on 
directorial conduct. It was found that in this area substantial reforms have been made, 
primarily as a result of the report of the Cadbury Committee, and potentially the 
Greenbury Report. Although the Report endorsed the unitary board structure, it 
recommended that non-executive directors be increased in number, and that their role 
be substantiated in order to improve corporate governance. The Report's principal 
recommendation was its Code of Best Practice which it urged all companies to 
implement. However, it is unlikely that, even were the Code of Best Practice to be 
implemented in the spirit and letter by all companies, this would resolve all corporate 
governance questions. As the Chair of the committee, Adrian Cadbury, conceded: 
' See Finch, "Personal Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors' and 
Officers' Liability Insurance", (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 880, at 880-887, for a consideration of 
the purposes of the various means of corporate control. 
"Codes wil l not catch rogues."2 Brudney has argued that the reason why 
governments and boards of directors support non-executive directors is that they 
"function as a market substitute that is less costly than regulation" Moreover, it is a 
sop which may have the result of alleviating concern regarding governance, though 
achieving little. Further, to accept the non-executive director as a substitute for 
governmental aid results in "less protection for consumers, suppliers, workers, and the 
general public".'' The paradox is that non-executive directors would be better able to 
carry out their governance duties were they to be operating within a defined system of 
regulation. However, it is the very presence of the non-executive director which such 
a system is to replace.^ Moreover, since publication of the Report more stringent 
corporate governance practices have become the norm, particularly regarding the 
disclosure of directors' remuneration. ^  
Accordingly, it was suggested that a statutory structure for the board of directors be 
established which incorporates the benefits of non-executives, but also other parties 
which may improve the governance and control exercised over directors, particularly 
employees. Such a structure could take the form of a two-tier board. To this extent, 
the influence of Europe in terms of the draft Fifth EC Company Law Directive, and 
the moves to increase the participation of employees in companies, is to be welcomed. 
Finally, Chapter Four analysed the role of shareholders in corporate governance, 
particularly the focus of shareholders as owners of the company, with rights akin to 
those of citizens in a representative democracy. It was found that institutional 
shareholders do have the power to exert considerable influence over corporate boards 
and individual directorial conduct, but that they often prefer not to become involved in 
detailed questions of corporate activity and management. Moreover, replacing confrol 
by individual shareholders with that of institutions was considered to be of potential 
concern as this may simply lead to domination by institutional shareholders following 
their own agendas, free from accountability, raising a whole new set of questions of 
accountability. 
2 Quoted in The Guardian, 17 July 1993. 
3 Brudney, "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkm Village?", (1982) 95 
Harvard Law Review 597, at 653. 
Ibid at 654. 
5 Ibid at 65%. 
6 See, inter alia. Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1995, and the Greenbury Report, Directors' 
Remuneration - Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, 1995.. 
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Thus, it can be seen that each individual aspect of directorial control has its place in 
regulating the conduct of directors, but that the present regime, considered as a whole, 
does not adequately control the conduct of directors. Further, the question of in 
whose interests control should be exercised is becoming increasingly complex as 
companies increasingly have to consider interests wider than shareholders alone. It is 
suggested that such moves towards an increasingly pluralist view of the company are 
to be welcomed and should be reflected in any changes to the means of controlling the 
conduct of directors. Hence, markets could be regulated more in the interests of the 
public, rather than in the interests of competition for its own sake. This would not 
amount to an interference in free markets: markets are already heavily regulated, this 
would simply be altering the focus of such regulation. Corporate boards could be 
urged to take into consideration wider interests than those of the company's 
shareholders. Thus, the management fimction would remain with the executive 
directors, pursuing profit maximisation, but the interests of other constituencies would 
be more voluble and, in turn, increasingly pursued. The notion that shareholders can 
effectively regulate, or indeed should do so alone, directorial conduct, should finally 
be jettisoned. In its place, a more proactive part could be played by government: 
increasing the use of its powers of intervention in corporate affairs, disqualification of 
directors, regulation of markets in the public interest, and using statute to ensure 
effective governance of directors rather than reliance on self-regulation. 
It should be noted that at present a number of areas of company law and activity are 
undergoing review. In November 1992, the Department of Trade and Industry 
armounced that it would be looking at selected areas of company law as part of a 
"rolling programme of reform".^ Thus, a number of the areas of law which have been 
the focus of this thesis are being reviewed. However, the review is being carried out 
with "deregulation" in mind, which is unlikely to improve governance of directorial 
conduct.^ Moreover, the review is a piece-meal study of selected areas. Although the 
Law Commission is involved in a number of the reviews^, and a Law Commissioner 
^ DTI Press Notice, 18 November 1992. The areas of law for reform identified by the DTI are 
as follows: private companies, Part X of the Companies Act 1985, Part VI of the Companies Act 1985, 
the law on groups, section 151 of the Companies Act 1985, dis-incorporation, registration of company 
charges, the 11th and bank branches directive (registration of overseas companies), public companies 
and paid up capital, company names, written resolutions, objects clauses, execution of documents, 
redeemable shares, company voluntary arrangements, disqualification and accountmg reference dates. 
^ Speech by Neil Hamilton, Minister for Corporate Affairs, to the Institute of Company 
Accountants, quoted in Palmer's In Company, 20 October 1993, at 1. 
5 For example, the Law Commission is conducting a review of shareholders' rights and 
remedies, see (1995) 16 Co Law 61, and Freedman, 'Reforming Company Law' in Patfield (ed) 
Perspectives on Company Law: 1, Kluwer Law International, 1995. 
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has been appointed with specific responsibility for company lawi°, there remains 
lacking an overall review of company law as a whole. The subtle changes in the focus 
of company activity noted above, namely the increasing role of third parties in 
corporate activity, wil l not be considered as the whole system, and its fundamental 
principles, are not under review. It is exactly this type of short term, and incomplete, 
review which has been so criticised in the past.'* 
Thus, it does not appear that in the near future legislative action on controlling the 
conduct of directors wil l be taken. A number of reviews may produce improvements, 
for example in relation to shareholder remedies, but the system will continue to be 
piece-meal and subject to many of the criticisms made in this thesis. It is to be hoped 
that such a view does not represent what will actually happen. However, in the 
meantime, the pressure must continue to be applied to those proponents of the status 
quo, in order that the governance of the company is effected in a manner which 
adequately supervises directors, and is in the interests of a wider body of persons than 
only shareholders. 
1° Ibid 
' • Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984; Morgan, "A Cold 
Climate for Business?", Law Society Gazette, 8 December 1993, at 3; Palmer's In Company, 20 
October 1993, at 1; editorial, (1993) 14 Co Law, at 162. Moreover, paragraph 6.5 of DTI, Company 
Law Review: The Law Applicable to Private Companies, A Consultative Document, November 1994, 
states that precise conclusions on its proposals cannot be made as other reviews are still pending. Of 
course, this will apply to all reviews conducted, and it is suggested, will resuU in inconsistency and 
incoherence. 
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